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1976 Supreme(MP) 8
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
A.P. Sen, J.
Panjumal Daulat Ram (Firm)
v.
Sakhi Gopal
S.A. No. 415 of 1971 against appellate decree passed by Shri L.N. Vyas, Additional District Judge, Satna reversing the decree passed by Shri G.S. Shukla, I Civil Judge, Class II, Satna,
Decided on : 21-1-1976.
R. N. Dabir for appellant;
K. N. Agrawal for respondent.
Headnote:(1) Precedents-rulings on other statutes-value of.
In interpretation of statutes, the Courts decline to consider other statutes proceeding on different lines and including different provisions, or judicial decisions thereon. [Para 6]
(2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP) - S. 12(1) - effect of non obstante clause-suit for eviction when tenable.
The true effect and meaning of the language of section 12(1) of the Act is that no suit for eviction of a tenant from an 'accommodation', as defined in section 2(a) of the Act, can be brought unless it is based on one or more of the grounds mentioned therein.
The Act, by the non obstante clause, gives to section 12(1) an overriding effect over all other laws including the Transfer of Property Act.
The existance of one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 12 (1) of the Act, therefore, constitutes a necessary part of the cause of action in a suit for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation. [Para 7]
(3) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP) - S. 12(1)(e) and (f) - composite tenancy for residential and non-residential purpose - eviction can be .ought for the dominent purpose-matters to be seen.
The absence of a provision relating to a composite premises viz., premises let for residential as well as non-residential purposes, does not necessarily mean that no suit can be filed by landlords for eviction of tenants from such premises. That would result in manifest absurdity. The legislature cannot be attributed with the intention of leaving a hiatus, i.e., of placing a blanket ban against eviction of such tenants. As is manifest, the Act recognises only two categories of buildings, residential and non-residential. In view of the settled law, that the contract of tenancy being a single and indivisible contract, the Court has no power to break up the unity of the contract or letting and attribute incidents and obligations to a part of the subject-matter of the contract which is not applicable to the rest. The Court has, therefore, to determine as to which of the two purposes was the dominent purpose, the other being subsidiary and ancillary to it. This depends on various factors, i.e., purpose for which the accommodation was Jet, or its user, its constructional design, situation, amenities available, conveniences provided, etc. [Para 9]
(4) Civil P.C., 1908 - S. 100 - finding as to bona fide requirement-is a finding of fact - cannot be challenged in second appeal. [Paras 12 & 13]
(5) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP)-S. 12 (6) - relates to a stage after the passing of the decree-applies only to the towns notified by the State Government.
[Para 16]
(6) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP) - S. 12(1)(e) and (f) - landlord residing out of the town where the accommodation is situate -can take advantage of the provision
It would be a fallacy to suggest that the provisions of clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act were meant for the benefit of landlords, who are residents of the city or town where the accommodation is situate. The provisions have been enacted for the benefit of the 'landlord' which means the lessor, irrespective of whether he is a resident of the city or town concerned or not. Non-resident landlords are, therefore, not deprived of the right to get tenants evicted from residential as well as non-residential premises, where they are in bona fide requirement of such premises. [Para 18]
A.P. Sen, J.- 1. Points of law urged in the appeal may be shortly stated, relying on the Kirayanama dated 1-11-55, it is urged that the demised premises having been let for a composite purpose, i.e., for non-residential as well as residential purposes, in the absence of a specific provision made in that behalf in section 12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the plaintiff's suit for ejectment based on his composite need, is not maintainable. The demised premises is situate in the heart of the business locality in Satna town. The defendant is a partnership firm carrying on cloth business from the ground floor, and the first floor is used for residential purposes. The Kirayanama Ex. P.1, shows the creation of a composite lease on a monthly rent of Rs. 250. It is urged that the contract of tenancy is one and indivisible, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting for nonresidential purposes, and the other for residential purposes, and to grant relief under clauses (e) or (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. It is said that unlike the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, there is no provision made for eviction of tenants from residential cum-non-residential. This, it is said, is a lacuna in the Act. The submission is based on the opening words of section 12(1) of the Act, which read as follows:-
"12. Restriction on eviction of tenants - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely."
Emphasis is laid on the non obatante clause, "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract," and the word "except," for the submission that no suit for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation as defined in section 2(a) can be entertained unless it is based on one or more of the grounds mentioned, therein. The word
"except." must, in the context, mean-"on no other grounds."
2. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S.K Bhardwaj and others, AIR 1963 SC 337 and Miss S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand, AIR 1908 PC 438, in support of the contention.
3. The decisions of their Lordships are an au hority for the proposition that, in the absence of a specific provision in the statute, the Court has no power to break up the unity of the contract of letting and attribute incidents and obligations to a part of the subject matter of toe contract which are not applicable to the rest. They proceed on the principle that the contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes, and to grant relief accordingly.
4. In Dr. Gopal Dass Verma's case, (supra) the premises in dispute were originally let for residential purposes; but subsequent to the letting, they were, with the consent of the landlord, used both for residential and non-residential purposes. The premises, therefore, by their user ceased to be premises let for residential purposes alone. In Miss S. Sanyal's case, (supra), there was a composite letting, i.e., for purposes non- residential as well as residential. In both the cases, the respective landlords brought suits for ejectment under section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, on the ground that they required the premises bona fide for their own residence. In Dr. Gopal Dass Verma's case, (supra), their Lordships held that the premises in that case had, by their user ceased, because of the consent of the landlord, to be premises let for residential purposes alone and since that were so, the Court had no jurisdiction to decree e
