1. By his report under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, the Sessions Judge, Chhindwara, has recommended that the conviction of the accused-owner Jeewanlal under section 42/123 of the Motor Vehicles Act, be set aside but the conviction on that count of accused Ramcharan and Ramsingh be confirmed, and that conviction of Ramsingh under section 22/122 of the said Act be set aside while the conviction on the said count of Ramcharan and Jeeewanial be confirmed.

2. On 28-7-1963 while checking the passenger bus owned by Jeewanlal and which was driven by Ramcharan with Ramsingh as its conductor it was found to be overloaded by allowing more passengers to travel therein than what was permitted, and that the said vehicle was not registered, its registration under the Motor Vehicles Act having expired on 30.6.1963.

3. The trying Magistrate convicted not only the driver and the conductor but also the owner Jeewanlal although he was not present in the bus at the time of checking.

4. According to the learned Sessions Judge, the owner could not be convicted with respect to the offence of overloading and the conductor could not be convicted with respect to the offence of plying the vehicle having no valid registration certificate. Hence his recommendations as pointed out in the beginning.

5. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge in recommending that the conviction of the accused-owner Jeewanlal be set aside cannot be accepted. The views expressed in the case of Mannasingh and another Vs. State [1960 JLJ 251=1960 MPLJ 384] could not be pressed into service by him in taking that view inasmuch as in that case the only question involved was whether a bus conductor and driver could be convicted or not, and not whether the Owner could be convicted or not. Any observations with regard to the latter question would be no authority for deciding the question involved in the instant case.

6. I had an occasion to examine vicarious liability of the absentee owner with regard to the offences of overloading of passengers, of non-issuance of tickets to the passengers carried in the bus and of carrying unauthorisedly persons in a goods vehicle truck and I have held that the owner would be liable. Both these matters had arisen out of similar reports from the Session Judge. Chhindwara [(See: The State of M.P. Vs. Wamanrao Pethe and others [Cr. Revision No. 358 of 1962; decided on the 12.2.1963] and The State of M.P. Vs. Purushottamlal [Cr. Revision No. 532 of 1963, decided on 14-3-1964]. For taking this view I had pointed out the legal position which I would repeat again hereafter.

7. Undoubtedly criminal responsibility is generally regarded as being essentially personal in character. Even so it is accepted that there may be occasions or cases where a person without having the guilty mind may be found guilty and punished for an offence which is actually committed by another. This aspect of the law was considered by the Privy Council in the case of Sriniwas Moll Bairoliya and another Vs. Emperor [ILR 26 Pat. 460=AIR 1947 PC 135] and it has been recognised therein that the offences which can be held to be committed without a guilty mind are usually of comparatively minor character where the relevant statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out Mens Rea as a constituent part of a crime [See: Sherras Vs. De Rutzen [1895-1 QB 918 at p. 921]. Now what those minor offences are or could be has been pointed out by Channell, J. in the case of Pearks Vs. Southern Counties Dairies Company, Limited [1902-KB 1 at 11] and I may usefully hereunder quote his words:

"By the general principles of the criminal law, if a matter is made a criminal offence, it is essential that there should be something in the nature of Mens Rea, and, therefore, in ordinary cases a corporation cannot be guilty of a criminal offence, nor can a master be liable criminally for an offence committed by his servant. But there are exceptions to this rule in the case of