1. This is a miscellaneous first appeal under section 62 (2) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, which, for brevity, would hereinafter be called the Act.

2. The circumstances under which this appeal has been filed are these. On 26 November 1963 the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (appellant) had made to the Employees' State Insurance Court, Jabalpur, an application under section 75 of the Act for recovery from the respondents, who were said to be employers, the contribution amounting to Rs. 567.74 which was payable by them under the provisions of the Act. The case was fixed "for filing documents and framing issues" on 2 September 1965. On that date, the appellant remained absent and the case was dismissed in default under Rule 24 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Employees' Insurance Courts Rules, 1963, framed under section 96 of the Act. Thereupon, on 26 September 1965, the Corporation applied under Rule 24 (5) of these rules for restoration of the application. It was however, dismissed on 16 March 1966 on the ground that the Corporation had not shown that it was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing on 2 September 1965. This appeal is directed against that order.

3. The learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeal, which sought to challenge an interlocutory order dated 16 March 1966 and not the final order dated 2 September 1965, was incompetent. In support of the point, the counsel relied upon J.C. Mills Vs. S.P.I. Corporation 1960 JLJ 259 = AIR 1960 MP 256. Even apart from the consideration that section 82 (2) of the Act, which provides for appeals, is in terms not so limited, the order challenged in this appeal, unlike the one in the case just mentioned, is a final order in the sense that it had finally disposed of the application dated 26 November 1963 made under section 75 of the Act. That being so, there is no substance in this preliminary objection.

3. Since an appeal lies under section 82 (2) of the Act against an order of an Employees' Insurance Court only when it involves a substantial question of law, the appellant's counsel argued that the application under section 75 of the Act could not at all be dismissed in default under Rule 24 (3) of the Rules because such a provision, which defeated the purpose of the Act, must be regarded as ultra vires. In the first place, this contention could be raised only in a direct appeal against the order of dismissal for default dated 2 September 1965 filed within sixty days thereof. Secondly, it is not open to one who has taken advantage of Rule 24, applied for restoration and then appealed against the restoration application. Finally, as I will show immediately, the provisions of Rule 24 do not really defeat the purpose of the Act.

4. Rule 24 reads as follows:

"24 (1) On the day fixed in the summons for the opposite party to appear and answer, the parties shall be in attendance at the Court in person or by their respective legal practitioners or any other person authorised under section 79 and the application shall then be heard unless the hearing is adjourned by the Court.

(2) When neither party appears when the application is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the application be dismissed.

(3) When the opposite party appears and the applicant does not appear when the application is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the application be dismissed unless the opposite party admits the claim or part thereof in which case the Court shall make an order against the opposite party upon such admission and where part only of the claim has been admitted, it shall dismiss the case so for as it relates to the remainder.

(4) Where the applicant appears and the opposite party after receiving the summons fails to appear when the application is called on for hearing, the Court may proceed ex-parte.

(5) Where the application is wholly or partly dismissed under sub rule (2) or (3), the applicant may w