1. This is a second appeal by the defendants-tenants, against the decree for their ejectment from the suit premises on the ground that the plaintiff-landlord No.4-genuinely requires the accommodation for starting his own business and that he is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city of Satna for that purpose.

2. Both the Courts below have decreed the suit, inter alia, holding-

(1) That the plaintiffs-respondents were the sole landlords of the defendants-tenants in respect of the suit premises

(2) That the tenancy of the defendants-tenants was validly terminated by a notice to quit expiring with the end of the month of their tenancy, which was from the 1st to the 30th or 31st of the English calendar month.

(3) That the defendants-tenants had, without the written permission of the landlords, made construction as have materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlords' interest within the meaning of section 4 (c) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955.

(4) That the plaintiff - landlords genuinely required the non residential accommodation in question for starting the medical practice of plaintiff-landlord No.4, and that they were not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city of Satna for that purpose within the meaning of section 4 (h) of the Act.

3. All the aforesaid findings are findings of fact based on an appreciation of the evidence on record and consequently not liable to interference in this second appeal. All the aforesaid questions in all their aspects have been very carefully and exhaustively considered by the learned Additional District Judge and nothing has been shown to me how and why they require a reconsideration in this second appeal.

4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the house in suit had been purchased by Basantlal, the father of the plaintiffs, and in the absence of any partition or registered deed of gift in favour of the plaintiffs, his sons, the sons could not acquire any title to it to make them the landlords of the defendants in respect of the suit premises. The learned Additional District Judge has correctly pointed out that the contention confuses between the ownership and the landlordship. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the fact whether in law title to the suit premises passed from the father to the sons under an arrangement made by them whereunder possession of the suit house was transferred to the sons who were also made the landlords of it by making the tenants of the suit premises attorn to them. The learned Additional District Judge has found that the defendants had duly attorned to the landlordship of the plaintiffs to whom they were also paying rent in respect of the premises thereafter. The plaintiffs were, therefore, rightly held to be the landlords of the defendants in respect of the suit premises and no exception can be taken to the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on the point.

5. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the defendants were a partnership which had come into existence on 5-11-1956, from which date it had entered into possession, and consequently their month of tenancy could never begin on the 1st of the English calendar month. The argument is misconceived. The date of the partnership entering into possession of the suit premises is one of the circumstances for inferring the date of commencement of the tenancy but not the sole circumstance. The creation of tenancy is a matter of contract. The date on which it is to begin is again a matter of contract the question has to be decided on evidence and in the instant case, besides the evidence of the plaintiffs Shankarlal (P.W.- 1), Balkrishna (P.W. 10) and Shiv Bhagwan (P.W-12) that the month of the tenancy of the defendants commenced on the 1st of the English calendar month and ended with the end of the month, there are also various other circumstance which weighed w