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2013 Supreme(MP) 471
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P. Sathasivam, C.J.I., Smt. Ranjana Prakash Desai and
Ranjan Gogoi, JJ.
Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd. and another
Criminal Appeal No.1079 of 2006 : against the judgment dated 9.8.2004, passed in Miscellaneous Criminal No.4385 of 2002 by
High Court of M.P., Bench at Gwalior; Decided on 26.8.2013.
Ms. Prerna Mehta with Ankur Mody, Vikas Mehta for appellant;
Sunil Gupta with Jasbir Singh Malike, Varun Punia,
Ms. Kamakshi S. Mehlwal for respondents.
Headnote:(1) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 -- Ss.138(c) and 142(b) -- offence under section 138 -- complaint -- calculation period of limitation -- day from or on which cause of action arose -- should be excluded.
Held : We have extensively referred to Saketh. The reasoning of this Court Saketh, based on the above English decisions and decision of this Court in Haru Das Gupta, which aptly lay down and explain the principle that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act has to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded, commends itself to us as against the reasoning of this Court in SIL Import USA, where there is no reference to the said decisions.
(2) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 -- Ss.138(c) and 142(b) -- offence under section 138 -- complaint -- calculation period of limitation -- exclusion of day from or on which cause of action arose -- conflict views taken in Saketh and SIL Import USA cases -- reference to Larger Bench -- view taken in Saketh case -- confirmed -- view taken in SIL Import USA -- held does not lay down correct law.
Question of reference :
“Whether the complaint filed under section 138 of the N.I. Act is within or beyond time as it was contended that it was not filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I. Act?”
The same question was reframed in simpler language as under :
“Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?”
Held : Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA, does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly. (1999)3 SCC 1 confirmed. (1994)4 SCC 567 no more good law.
(3) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 -- Ss.138(c) and 142(b) -- Limitation Act, 1963 -- Ss.12(1) and 12(2) -- General Clauses Act, 1897 -- S.9 -- offence under section 138 -- complaint -- calculation period of limitation -- applicability of provisions of Limitation Act and General Clauses Act -- even if Limitation Act is not applicable -- General Clauses Act is applicable -- by virtue of section 9 of General Clauses Act -- day on which cause of action arose has to be excluded.
It was submitted that in Saketh this Court has erroneously placed reliance on section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) states that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. In section 12(2) the same principle is extended to computing period of limitation for an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment. Our attention was drawn to Subodh S. Salaskar wherein this Court has held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the N.I. Act.
Held : It is true that in Subodh S. Salaskar, this Court has held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the N.I. Act. However, even if the Limitation Act, 1963 is held not applicable to the N.I. Act, the conclusion reached in Saketh could still be reached with the aid of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 states that in any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient to use the word ‘from’ for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time and to use the word ‘to’ for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time. Sub-section (2) of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 states that this section applies to all Central Acts made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887. This section would, therefore, be applicable to the N.I. Act.
As the Limitation Act is held to be not applicable to N.I. Act, drawing parallel from Tarun Prasad Chatterjee where the Limitation Act was held not applicable, we are of the opinion that with the aid of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 it can be safely concluded in the present case that while calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose.
(4) Words and Phrases -- words “from” and “of” in section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act -- used at different places -- meaning of -- not convey different meaning.
Held : It is not possible to agree with the counsel for the respondents that the use of the two different words ‘from’ and ‘of’ in section 138 at different places indicates the intention of the legislature to convey different meanings by the said words. AIR 1967 Bombay 138 and (2004)7 SCC 33 referred to.
¼1½ ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e] 1881 & /kkjk 138¼x½ rFkk 142¼[k½ && /kkjk 138 ds v/khu vijk/k && f’kdk;r && ifjlhek dkykof/k dh x.kuk && fnol ls vFkok ftl ij okn gsrqd mRiUu gqvk && vioftZr fd;k tkuk pkfg,A
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % geus lkdsFk dks O;kid :i ls fufnZ”V fd;k gSA lkdsFk esa bl U;k;ky; dk rdZ mi;qZDr vaxzsth fu.kZ;ksa rFkk gk: nkl xqIrk esa bl U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; ij vk/kkfjr gS tks Bhd <ax ls bl fl)kar dks vf/kdfFkr vkSj Li”V djrk gS fd tgk¡ fdlh fuf’pr rkjh[k ls fof’k”V le; fn;k x;k gks ftlds Hkhrj dksbZ dk;Z fd;k tkuk gS] rkjh[k ds fnol dks vioftZr fd;k tkuk gS] fly bEiksVZ ;w ,l , esa tgk¡ mi;qZDr fu.kZ; fufnZ”V ugha gS bl U;k;ky; ds rdZ ds fo:) ds :i esa gesa Lor% ;kn fnykrk gSA
¼2½ ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e] 1881 && /kkjk 138¼x½ rFkk 142¼[k½ && /kkjk 138 ds v/khu vijk/k && f’kdk;r && ifjlhek dkykof/k dh x.kuk && fnol ls ;k ftl ij okn gsrqd mRiUu gqvk dk viotZu && lkdsFk rFkk fly bEiksVZ ;w ,l , ds izdj.kksa esa fd, x, fopkjksa esa fojks/k && c`gr~ U;k;ihB dks funsZ’k && lkdsFk izdj.k esa fd;k x;k fopkj && vfHkiq”V && fly bEiksVZ ;w ,l , izdj.k esa fd;k x;k fopkj && ‘kq) fof/k vf/kdfFkr ugha gksuk vfHkfu/kkZfjrA
funsZ’k dk iz’u %
^^D;k ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 138 ds v/khu izLrqr dh xbZ f’kdk;r le; ds Hkhrj ;k ckgj gS tSlk fd rdZ fd;k x;k fd ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 138 ds [kaM ¼x½ ds v/khu okn gsrqd mRiUu gksus dh rkjh[k ls ;g ,d ekl ds Hkhrj izLrqr ugha dh xbZ Fkh\**
ogh iz’u ljy Hkk”kk esa fuEukuqlkj iqu% fojfpr fd;k x;k %
^^D;k ,d ekl dh dkykof/k dh x.kuk djus ds fy, tks /kkjk 142¼[k½ ds v/khu fofgr gS] fnol ftl ij okn gsrqd mRiUu gqvk gS mls vioftZr dj dkykof/k dh x.kuk dh tkuk gS\**
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % bl izdj.k esa varoZfyr iz’u ij mfpr ifjizs{; esa fopkj djrs gq,] lqlaxr fu.kZ;ksa ds vkyksd esa] ge bl jk; esa gSa fd lkdsFk fof/k dh lgh izfriknuk,a vf/kdfFkr djrk gSA ,d ekl dh dkykof/k dh x.kuk djus ds iz;kstu ds fy, ge vfHkfu/kkZfjr djrs gSa fd] tks ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 142¼[k½ ds v/khu fofgr gS] fnol ftl ij okn gsrqd mRiUu gqvk gS mls vioftZr dj dkykof/k dh x.kuk djuk gksxhA ge vfHkfu/kkZfjr djrs gSa fd fly bEiksVZ ;w ,l , lgh fof/k vf/kdfFkr ugha djrkA ;g dgus dh vko’;drk ugha gS fd bl U;k;ky; dk dksbZ fu.kZ; tks bl U;k;ky; }kjk lkdsFk esa fd, x, fopkj tks gekjs }kjk vfHkiq”V fd;k x;k gS] ds izfrdwy fopkj djrk gS] bl funsZ’k esa varoZfyr iz’u ij lgh fof/k vf/kdfFkr ugha djrkA rn~uqlkj funsZ’k dk mRrj fn;k tkrk gSA ¼1999½3 ,l lh lh 1 vfHkiq”VA ¼1999½4 ,l lh lh 567 vc ekU; fof/k ughaA
¼3½ ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e] 1881 && /kkjk 138¼x½ rFkk 142¼[k½ && ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 && /kkjk 12¼1½ rFkk 12¼2½ && lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e] 1897 && /kkjk 9 && /kkjk 138 ds v/khu vijk/k && f’kdk;r && ifjlhek dkykof/k dh x.kuk && ifjlhek vf/kfu;e rFkk lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e ds mica/kksa dk ykxw gksuk && ;fn ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ykxw Hkh ugha gksrk gS && lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e ykxw gksrk gS && lk/kkjk [kaM vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 9 ds vk/kkj ls && fnol ftl ij okn gsrqd mRiUu gqvk gS mls vioftZr fd;k tkuk gSA
;g fuosnu fd;k x;k fd lkdsFk esa ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 dh /kkjk 12¼1½ rFkk ¼2½ dk xyr voyac fy;k x;k gSA /kkjk 12¼1½ vfHkO;Dr djrh gS fd fdlh okn] vihy vFkok vkosnu ds fy, ifjlhek dkykof/k dh lax.kuk djus ds fy, fnol ftlls ,slh dkykof/k dh x.kuk dh tkrh gS] vioftZr fd;k tk,xkA /kkjk 12¼2½ esa ogh fl)kar fu.kZ; dh vihy dh vuqefr ds vkosnu ds fy, ;k iqujh{k.k ds fy, ;k iqufoZyksdu ds fy, ifjlhek dkykof/k dh lax.kuk ds fy, foLrkfjr fd;k x;k gSA gekjk /;ku lqcks/k ,l- lkykldj dh vksj vkdf”kZr fd;k x;k Fkk ftlesa bl U;k;ky; us vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dks ykxw ugha gksrk gSA
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % ;g lR; gS fd bl U;k;ky; us lqcks/k ,l- lkykldj esa ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k gS fd ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dks ykxw ugha gksrk gSA fQj Hkh ;fn ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k tkrk gS fd ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dks ykxw ugha gksrk gS] lkdsFk esa fudkys x, fu”d”kZ lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e] 1897 dh /kkjk 9 dh lgk;rk ls vc Hkh fudkyk tk ldrk gSA lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e] 1897 dh /kkjk 9 vfHkO;Dr djrh gS fd fdlh dsanzh; vf/kfu;e ;k fofu;eu esa tks lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e] 1897 ds izkjaHk ds i’pkr~ cuk;k x;k gS] fnuksa dh J`a[kyk esa izFke vioftZr djus ds iz;kstu ds fy, ‘kCn ^^ls** dk iz;ksx djuk i;kZIr gksxk vFkok le; dh fdlh vU; dkykof/k rFkk fnuksa dh J`a[kyk esa ;k le; dh fdlh vU; dkykof/k ds iz;ksx ds fy, vafre dks lfEefyr djus ds fy, ‘kCn ^^dks** dk iz;ksx i;kZIr gksxkA lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e] 1897 dh /kkjk 9 dh mi/kkjk ¼2½ vfHkO;Dr djrh gS fd ;g /kkjk tuojh] 1868 ds rhljs fnol ds i’pkr~ cuk, x, leLr dsanzh; vf/kfu;eksa rFkk tuojh] 1887 ds pkSngosa fnol dks ;k i’pkr~ cuk, x, leLr fofu;euksa dks ykxw gksrh gSA blfy,] ;g /kkjk ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dks ykxw gksxhA
tSlk fd ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dks ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ykxw ugha gksuk vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gS] r:.k izlkn pVthZ ls le:i vkdf”kZr djrs gq, ftlesa ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ykxw ugha gksuk vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k Fkk] gekjh jk; gS fd lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e] 1897 dh /kkjk 9 dh lgk;rk ls bl izdj.k esa fuf’pr :i ls ;g fu.khZr fd;k tk ldrk gS fd ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 142¼[k½ ds v/khu fofgr ,d ekl dh dkykof/k dh lax.kuk djrs le; ftl fnu okn gsrqd mRiUu gqvk gks mls vioftZr djrs gq, ifjlhek dh x.kuk dh tkuk gksxhA
¼4½ ‘kCn rFkk okD; && ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 138 esa ‘kCn ^^ls** rFkk ^^ds** && fHkUu&fHkUu LFkkuksa ij iz;qDr && dk vFkZ && fHkUu&fHkUu vFkZ O;Dr ugha djrsA
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % izR;FkhZx.k ds dkmUlsy ls blls lger gksuk laHko ugha gS fd /kkjk 138 esa fHkUu&fHkUu LFkkuksa ij nks fHkUu&fHkUu ‘kCnksa ^^ls** rFkk ^^ds** ds iz;ksx ls fo/kku eaMy dk vk’k; minf’kZr djrk gS fd mi;qZDr ‘kCnksa ls fHkUu&fHkUu vFkZ O;Dr gksrk gSA , vkb vkj 1967 ckWEcs 138 rFkk ¼2004½7 ,l lh lh 33 fufnZ”VA
Smt. Desai, J. -- 1. On 13.10.2006, while granting leave is Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.211 of 2005, this Court passed the following order :
“In our view, the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Saketh India Ltd. and others v. India Securities Ltd. [(1999)3 SCC 1], requires reconsideration. Orders of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice may be obtained for placing this matter before a larger Bench.”
Pursuant to the above order, this appeal is placed before us.
2. Since the referral order states that the judgment of this Court in Saketh India Ltd. and others v. India Securities Ltd. (“Saketh”) (supra), requires reconsideration, we must first refer to the said judgment. In that case, this Court identified the question of law involved in the appeal before it as under :
“Whether the complaint filed under section 138 of the N.I. Act is within or beyond time as it was contended that it was not filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I. Act?”
The same question was reframed in simpler language as under :
“Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?”
3. It is pointed out to us that there is a variance between the view expressed by this Court on the above question in Saketh and in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore [(1999)4 SCC 567]. We will have to therefore re-examine it for the purpose of answering the reference. The basic provisions of law involved in this reference are proviso (c) to section 138 and section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the N.I. Act”).
4. Facts of Saketh need to be stated to understand how the above question of law arose. But, before we turn to the facts, we must quote section 138 and section 142 of the N.I. Act. We must also quote section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, on which reliance is place in Saketh.
Section 138 of the N.I. Act reads as under :
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. -- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both :
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless --
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holderr in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”
Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under :
“142. Cognizance of offences. -- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), --
(a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable und
