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2013 Supreme(MP) 451
MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
S.K. Gangele and G.D. Saxena, JJ.
State of M.P. v. Amar Kaur
Review Petitions No.351 to 360 of 2012 (Gwalior) : against the order passed in Writ Appeal No.205 of 2012; Decided on 16.8.2013.
Raghvendra Dixit, Government Advocate for petitioner/State;
Smt. Deeksha Mishra for respondents.
Headnote:(1) Constitution of India -- Art.300A -- Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 -- Ss.12(2), 19 to 24 -- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -- Ss.4 and 6 -- State may deprive a person of his right to property only for public purpose -- reasonable amount by way of compensation will be offered for acquisition of land -- procedural safeguards for depriving such right must be scruplously complied with.
Held : Learned Government Advocate for the petitioners/State has been unable to point out as to on which date the order in compliance of the aforesaid directions issued on dated 25th July, 2007 has been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer, Shivpuri under section 12(2) of the Act. It is true that under the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India as also the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may deprive a person of this right to a property only when there exists a public purpose and a reasonable amount by way of compensation is offered for acquisition of his land and the procedural safeguards for depriving such right must be scrupulously complied with. AIR 2013 SC 565 followed.
(2) Limitation Act, 1963 -- S.5 -- review petition delayed due to not applying for certified copy of order in proper time -- liberal approach for deciding the case on merits adopted -- delay condoned. (1987)2 SCC 107 followed. (2000)9 SCC 94 referred to. [Para 6
¼1½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq-300d && oU; tho ¼laj{k.k½ vf/kfu;e] 1972 && /kkjk 12¼2½] 19 ls 24 && Hkwfe vtZu vf/kfu;e] 1894 && /kkjk 4 rFkk 6 && jkT; fdlh O;fDr dks mlds laifRr ds vf/kdkj ls dsoy yksd iz;kstu ls gh oafpr dj ldrk gS && Hkwfe ds vtZu ds fy, izfrdj ds :i esa ;qfDr;qDr jde dk izLrko fn;k tk,xk && bl vf/kdkj ls oafpr djus ds fy, izfØ;kRed laj{k.kksa dk fu”Bk ls vuqikyu fd;k tkuk pkfg,A
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % ;kphx.k&jkT dh vksj ls fo}ku ljdkjh vf/koDrk blds fo”k;d crkus esa vleFkZ jgs gSa fd Hkwfe vtZu vf/kdkjh≶&mi[kaM vf/kdkjh] f’koiqjh }kjk fnukad 25 tqykbZ] 2007 dks tkjh iwoksZDr funs’kksa ds vuqikyu esa vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12¼2½ ds v/khu vkns’k fdl fnukad dks ikfjr fd;k x;kA ;g lR; gS fd Hkkjr ds lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 300d esa varfoZ”V mica/kksa rFkk Hkwfe vtZu vf/kfu;e ds mica/kksa ds Hkh v/khu] jkT; viuh ^^loksZifj vf/kdkj** dh ‘kfDr ds iz;ksx esa fdlh O;fDr dks mlds laifRr ds vf/kdkj ls dsoy rHkh oafpr dj ldrk gS tc yksd iz;kstu fo|eku gks rFkk mldh Hkwfe ds vtZu ds fy, izfrdj ds :i esa ;qfDr;qDr jde dk izLrko fn;k tk, rFkk bl vf/kdkj ls oafpr djus ds fy, izfØ;kRed laj{k.kksa dk fu”Bk ls vuqikyu fd;k tkuk pkfg,A , vkb vkj 2013 ,l lh 565 vuqlfjrA
¼2½ ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 && /kkjk 5 && vkns’k dh izekf.kr izfr ds fy, mfpr le; esa vkosnu u djus ds dkj.k iqufoZyksdu ;kfpdk foyafcr && xq.kkxq.k ds vk/kkj ij ekeys dk fofu’p; djus ds fy, mnkj n`f”Vdks.k viuk;k x;k && foyac ekQ fd;k x;kA ¼1987½2 ,l lh lh 107 vuqlfjrA ¼2000½9 ,l lh lh 94 fufnZ”VA ¼iSjk 6½
Saxena, J. -- 1. Since the order challenged in the aforesaid review petitions is one and the same, all these petitions are herewith, taken up together for final disposal by this common order.
2. As the instant review preferred by the petitioners/State is hit with delay of 62 days for which an I.A. No.3990/12 under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been moved, before considering the contents of review, we think it proper to take up first the contents of application seeking condonation of delay.
3. The grounds for causing delay in submitting the review petition are that after pronouncement of the order dated 6th July, 2012 in Writ Appeal No.205/2012, the certified copy was obtained on 31st August, 2012 by the concerning department. Then, the matter was referred for obtaining necessary sanction and after receiving concurrence, the review petition came to be filed. It is mentioned in the application that the time was exhausted due to departmental procedure which was not based on mala fide on the part of the petitioners. Hence, it is requested that by allowing the application, delay that was caused in preferring the review petition may be condoned and the review itself may be heard on merits. To support submissions contained in the application, reliance is placed on the decision of Hon’ble apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad [(2000)9 SCC 94].
4. Opposing the aforesaid prayer, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that the delay was caused due to negligent acts of the officer-in-charge of the case who, despite of getting knowledge, did not take proper steps for legal recourses in compliance of the directions contained in the order dated 6th July, 2012. The officer-in-charge further failed to take requisite steps for contesting the matter before the Court of law within the period prescribed of limitation. So, according to the learned counsel the State cannot take the advantage of the negligent acts of its employees in this way. On this basis, it is prayed that the application for condonation of delay may be dismissed.
5. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji [(1987)2 SCC 107, at p.108], the Hon’ble apex Court considered the question of delay in filing the appeal beyond limitation and was pleased to observe as follows :
“2. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice -- that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that :
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every days’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, o
