The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of Section 23-C and 23-G of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act in the eviction process, including the requirement for sufficient grounds to contest eviction and the timeline for vacating the premises.

1. This revision application under Section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short "the Act of 1961") has been filed by the tenant/applicant-Praveen against the eviction order dated 12-12-2012 passed by Rent Controlling Authority in Case No. 22-B/121/12-13.

2. No exhaustive statements of facts are required to be narrated for the purpose of disposal of this revision. Suffice it to say that an application for eviction of the suit premises under Section 23-A of the said Act has been filed by the respondent No. 1 against the present applicant, on the basis of that he comes under the special clause of the landlord as envisaged under Section 23-J of the said Act, since he is a retired Government employee. According to the plaintiff/respondent No 1, the applicant is a tenant in the residential accommodation of plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month and because the plaintiff is a retired Government employee and despite his requests the tenant/defendant (present applicant-Praveen) did not vacate the suit premises, hence an application for eviction has been filed by the landlord.

3. On bare perusal of the impugned order dated 12-12-2012, this Court finds that after the tenant/defendant was served, he appeared and submitted an application seeking leave to defend under Section 23-C of the Act. However, later on, he did not appear on 21-1-2012, eventually he was proceeded exparte. Thereafter, the tenant/defendant submitted an application under Order 9 Rule 7, CPC, which was allowed by the learned Rent Controlling Authority and thereafter, the arguments of the parties were heard. The factum of obtaining the suit accommodation on tenancy basis has been admitted by the tenant/defendant. The learned Rent Controlling Authority found that no ground has been raised in the application to leave the defend on the basis of which the leave to defend is to be granted and hence the application for leave to defend has been rejected and eventually the eviction decree has been passed.

4. The contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant/tenant is that the learned Rent Controlling Authority ought to have allowed the application seeking leave to defend the case, having not done so, the impugned order has been illegally passed. It has been then contended by him that even if the application for eviction of the plaintiff h to be allowed, two months time ought to have been allowed to vacate the suit premises and in this regard my attention has been drawn to Section 23-G of the said Act. Learned Counsel submits that prior to expiry of the aforesaid statutory period, on 18-12-2012, a notice was issued to the applicant by the learned Rent Controlling Authority that the suit premises be vacated within three days, which is contrary to Section 23-G of the said Act, hence it has been prayed that the impugned order of eviction be set aside and the learned Rent Controlling Authority be directed to allow the application of leave to defend and further be directed to hear the matter on merits after providing opportunity to the parties to adduce the evidence and the learned Rent Controlling Authority be also directed to deliver back the possession of the suit premises to the present applicant (defendant/tenant).

5. On the other hand, Shri Rahul Rawat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 submitted that without assigning any cogent ground, an application under Section 23-C of the said Act for leave to defend has been filed by the tenant/defendant, who has filed this revision application and therefore, the learned Rent Controlling Authority by the impugned order has rightly rejected the same. Since, no cogent ground has been raised in the application for obtaining leave to defend, therefore, the eviction order has been rightly passed by the said authority. The learned Counsel for the respondent further submits that he is not in a position to say whether the possession of the house in question was obtained by the plaintiff/re