JUDGMENT

1. This criminal appeal has been filed under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 being crestfallen by the order dated 15.11.2021 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore (M.P.) in SC NIA No. 16712/2011 by which the learned Judge has acquitted the respondents.

2. An application I.A. No. 12489/2022 has also been filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing this revision. The revision petition is barred by 94 days.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order dated 15.11.2021 passed by the learned trial Court wherein, the complaint of the appellant against the respondents was dismissed in default of nonprosecution. He has also submitted that non-appearance of the appellant's counsel on the intended date i.e. 28.10.2021 only occasioned due to inadvertence on the part of counsel's clerk in noting the date incorrectly as 28.1.2022 by which time, the complaint was already dismissed. The same may be read in consonance with this application for condonation of delay. He has further submitted that the knowledge of said impugned order was derived only in the first week of July, 2022, the appellant has been steadfast in approaching this Hon'ble Court after making inquiries and obtaining certified copies of the proceedings and impugned order.

4. It is also contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3/2022 vide order dated 10.1.2022 has directed that the period between 23.3.2020 to 28.2.2022 would not be considered for computing limitation and in the event of expiry of limitation within such period, an additional period of 90 days shall be granted for all such matter. In light of aforesaid additional grace period of 90 days since 28.2.2022 and summer vacation of the Hon'ble High Court till 14.6.2022, the delay in filing the instant criminal appeal would only commence from 15.6.2022 onwards. Consequently, a delay of 92 days has occasioned till the date of filing this instant criminal appeal.

5. In addition to that, he has also stated that non-appearance of the appellant on two dates only occasioned due to inadvertence on the part of his counsel and the appellant should not be made to suffer personally on account of such mistake. Furthermore, the amount sought by the appellant is substantial and a significant period of time has already elapsed since the institution of the complaint in the year 2010. On these grounds, he has prayed for condonation of delay for a period of 92 days and allowed the application of leave to appeal.

6. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner is supposed to have knowledge about the Court proceedings. The appellant has filed this appeal with an intention. Therefore, an ex-parte order was passed by the learned trial Court after giving sufficient opportunities and the appellant was very well aware to the fact of the case. It is also submitted that the appellant has not filed the petition challenging the impugned order within the limitation period. Hence, the learned counsel for the respondents prays for dismissal of the application for condonation of delay and the petition as well.

7. On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble apex Court in the case o f Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of A.P. & Ors reported in 2011 (4) SCC 363, wherein the Hon'ble apex Court has discussed the point of limitation, of which the extract thereof reproduced as under :--

26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restr