1. Petitioner upon selection was appointed as a member of the Madhya Pradesh Police under Act V of the Police Act, 1861 and posted as Constable. Regulation 59 of the Madhya Pradesh Regulations (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations') is relevant and the same is quoted below :

“59. Probation. Every recruit will be on probation for two years' which may be in two periods of six months each, if the Superintendent considers it desirable. During this probationary period his services may be dispensed with with at any time, if in the opinion of the Superintendent, he is unlikely to become a satisfactory police officer.”

2. Earlier petitioner's services were terminated vide termination order dated 27.2.2015 (Annexure P-4) purportedly on the ground that Criminal Case No.21/2013 for the offence under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B, 409, 417, 201 of IPC and sections 3(i), 3(ii)/4 of the M.P.Recognized Examination Act, 1937, sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 as well as sections 65 and 66 of the I.T.Act has been registered by the Special Task Force, M.P., Bhopal. The aforesaid termination order was challenged before the Principal Seat by filing Writ Petition No.11353/2015 and the Division Bench vide order dated 5.8.2015 has set aside the same. However, liberty was granted to the respondents' to take appropriate action against the petitioner in accordance with law. The operative portion of the reads as under :

“We have considered the submissions made be learned counsel for the parties and we have also gone through the impugned order dated 27.2.2015 passed by the respondents. On going through the impugned order, we find that the services of the petitioner have been terminated by giving one month's notice, but the order is stigmatic in nature in the order of termination the misconduct has been alleged against the petitioner. In the circumstances, in absence of any show cause notice or holding any enquiry against the petitioner, we are of the considered view that services of the petitioner could not have been terminated in the manner in which it has been done.

In the result, we set aside the order dated 27.2.2015, a liberty is granted to respondents to take an appropriate action against the petitioner, if so advised in accordance with law.

With the aforesaid, writ petition stands disposed of.”

3. Petitioner was reinstated in service vide order dated 8.9.2015 (Annexure P-6). Admittedly, no notice was issued or opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before issuance of the impugned termination order dated 15.9.2015. Petitioner has challenged the same in Writ Petition No.968 of 2016 at the Principal Seat and the same was disposed of vide order dated 29.1.2016 with liberty to the petitioner to file a representation under regulation 274 of the Regulations and it was further directed that the authority shall decide the representation on merits expeditiously. Petitioner had submitted representation on 22.2.2016 (Annexure P-8). The representation has been rejected by the Inspector General of Police on 26.3.2016 and communicated the same to the petitioner vide order dated 2.4.2016 (Annexure P-2).

4. In the counter-affidavit, the impugned termination order dated 15.9.2015 (Annexure P-1) is justified on the basis of the same allegations which were addressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.11353/2015 (supra), while allowing the writ petition and set aside the order of termination dated 27.2.2015.

5. Now, in the context of the aforesaid factual matrix, it is well evident that the impugned order of termination dated 15.9.2015 ex facia innocuously worded to justify the same in purported exercise of the power under regulation 59 of the Regulations. However, the termination order in fact and in effect is camouflaged and justification of the order is explained in the counter-affidavit which had been earlier is held to be stigmatic in nature and the termination order dated 27.