1985 Supreme(MP) 729

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
P.D. Mulye, J.
Rambha Bai - Petitioner
Vs.
Registrar of Public Trusts - Respondent
M.P. No. 48 of 1980 (I)
Decided On : 13-12-1985

Headnote:(1) Public Trusts Act, 1951 (M.P.) – S. 26 and 27 – Charges leveled with respect to management of Trust – Registrar should make summary enquiry before sending the case to District Court under S.27.

       (2) Constitution of India – Arts. 226 and 227 – petition relating to mismanagement of Public Trust – civil suit being barred is not alternative remedy.

       (3) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – S.92 – matter relating to section 26 of M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 – Civil suit is barred under S.27(4) of the Act.

        Short Note

       According to the petitioner respondents Nos. 2 to 6 have formed a group of which respondent No.2. Shri Hukumchand is the leader. That the said respondent No.2 and his associate trustees have embarked on a policy to ignore the President altogether to oblige people at the cost of the trust to act and behave negligently towards the management of the trust and to attempt to alienate the property of the trust without any necessity. Further according to the petitioner, in her opinion, the activities of respondents Nos. 2 to 6 are detrimental to the interest of the trust. The petitioner, therefore, filed an application dated 19 – 12 – 78 before respondent No.1 the Registrar of Public Trusts. Ujjain under S. 26 and 27 of the M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 in which the petitioner has given the details regarding her complaint and charges against respondents Nos. 2 to 6 as per Annexure – I.

       2. Held: In the present case there are allegations and counter allegations made by the parties against each other regarding the manner in which the trust is being managed. According to the petitioner her case is covered by clause (a) and (b) of sub – section (1) of S.26 of the said Act. A bare perusal of the allegations and counter allegations made by them against each other would show that they are serious in nature because this is not a case where one of the trustees namely the petitioner, who is also the President of the trust, is making allegations against the other trustees. But even the other trustees have serious grievance against the petitioner who feel that it is the petitioner who is putting obstacles in the working of the trust with the result that certain schemes which those trustees want to be implemented in the interest of the trust are being stalled by the petitioner herself.

       3. It is also clear that similar allegations and counter – allegations were made by all these parties against one another even before respondent No. 1, namely the Registrar of Public Trusts. In this state of affair in my opinion it was necessary for the Registrar, namely respondent No. 1 to make a preliminary enquiry to find out prima facie the truth about the allegations and counter allegations made by the parties and for that purpose he ought to have given an opportunity to both the parties to lead some evidence within a specified period. It is no doubt true that under S.26 the satisfaction contemplated is the satisfaction of the Registrar, but in such a situation that satisfaction must not only be subjective but it must be objective also. The impugned order passed by the Registrar, Annexure P – 3 would indicate that the Registrar felt that certain allegations made against respondent No.2 being of a personal nature he cannot consider the same. However, it is apparent that those allegations, though of a personal nature, have been made against him in the capacity of a managing trustee. Similar allegations are made against the other trustees in their capacity as trustees. Therefore, it was necessary for the Registrar to give an opportunity to both the parties to lead some evidence, though of a summary nature, before getting himself satisfied whether any prima facie case has been made out by the petitioner in order to attract the provisions of S.27 of the said Act.

       4. It is, no doubt, true that the case was being adjourned from time to time before the Registrar for bearing arguments and it appears that no specific prayer was made by the parties to lead evidence regarding the case. But even then it was for the Registrar to have called upon the parties to substantiate their allegations before arriving at some definite conclusion.

       5. Even according to the provisions of S.26 the Registrar at first is expected to give an opportunity of being heard to the working trustee and thereafter only he can direct such trustee to apply to the Court for directions within the time specified by him and in case such a trustee fails to make an application as required, then only he himself has to make an application to the Court if he considers it expedient as provided in sub – section (2) of S.26 of the said Act. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that because the petitioner is now sufficiently aged and that it would take some time before the Registrar to lead evidence by the parties, the Registrar be straight – way directed to refer the matter to the District Court, under S.27 of the said Act, cannot be accepted. A bare reading of S.27 would indicate the powers of the Court to hear such applications as any order passed by the Court under sub – section (2) shall be deemed to be a decree of such Court against which an appeal lies to the High Court. Sub – section (4) of S.27 provides that no suit relating to a Public Trust under S.92 C.P.C., 1908 shall be entertained by any Court on any matter in respect of which an application can be made under S.26. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No.3 Shri Patni that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing a suit as contemplated by S.92 CPC has to be rejected on this short ground alone. (Please see 1979 MPLJ 227 (Mahant Narayandas v. Registrar, Public Trusts, Bilaspur) and 1982 JLJ 195 (V.V. Dravid v. State). Petition allowed.