1986 Supreme(MP) 487
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
S.S. Sharma, J.
Quasim – Applicant
Versus
Jamaluddin – Non-applicant
C. R. No. 86 of 1986 (J)
Decided On : 26-08-1986
For the Applicant : K.L. Issrani
For the Non-applicant : S.K Banerjee
Headnote:(1) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – S. 13 (1) – applicability of – It is applicable whether or not the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted or not.
(2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) – S. 13 (6) – enquiry under – pleadings and documents on recorded should be considered.
Short Note
1. Learned lower Court by the impugned order decided two applications – one under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), submitted on behalf of the defendants and the other plaintiff's application under Section 13 (6) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The Court below by the impugned order rejected the defendants' application against that part of the order, the defendants did not take any steps and so it is not necessary to consider that question. He also rejected the plaintiff's application under Section 13 (6) of the Act, for striking out the defendants defence, against eviction. In that part of the order what the learned Judge observes in – “in my opinion, looking to the serious contentions raised by the defendants as to existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties the defendants defence against eviction should not be struck out". He further observed that defendant No.1 seems not have deposited the rent as according to him he is not the tenant but the real owner and anything said or done at this stage would prejudice the serious contention raised by him."
Held : Here I may refer to Division Bench decision of this Court in Inderlal v. Mahugil Bai and others (1967 JLJ 31), wherein it has been laid down that – “The view that section 13 (1) applies not only when the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted by the defendant, but also where the relationship is denied by him, finds support in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Messrs. I & M Ltd. v. Pherose Framroze (AIR 1953 SC 73) and Babulal v. Nadram (AIR 1958 SC 677)". In paragraph 6 of the said decision it has further been laid down that – "In our judgment, the applicability of Section 13 (i) of the Act is not dependent in any way on the determination of the Court that the defendant sued is a tenant of the plaintiff landlord. The liability of the defendant to make deposit under that provision arises the moment a suit for eviction is filed against him by the plaintiff landlord alleging that he is his (plaintiff’s) tenant It makes no different to the applicability of Section 13 (1) whether the defendant admits the relationship of landlord and tenant or denies it".
2. As it is, the Court below also does not say that since the tenancy is disputed, section 13 (6) of the Act is not attracted. All that be says is that serious contentions having been raised by the defendants about the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, the defendant's defence against eviction should not be struck out. Assuming that under Section 13 (6) of the Act it was discretionary to strike out the defence against eviction or not to so strike it out, the discretion has to be judicious one and there has to be some circumstances where under the Court feels inclined to depart from the normal course of striking out the defence owing to the non – compliance of the requirements of Section 13 (l) of the Act regarding deposit of the rent. As back as in 1966 when Inderlal’s case (supra) came to be decided, the observation was made in paragraph 7 of the said decision that – "It is now very common for the defendants in ejectment suit to deny the plaintiff landlord's title, and such a denial is generally the main issue in the suit. The impugned order in this behalf does not at all mention any such circumstance excepting for saying that "serious contentions have been raised by the defendants" which could entitle the learned Judge to reject the plaintiff's application under Section 13 (6) of the Act in exercise of his discretionary power. The difficulty seems to have been expressed by the learned Judge that anything being said at this stage may prejudice the serious contentions of the defendants, is hardly the reason. There are cases wherein under other provisions of law the Court is required to see whether or not is there a prima facie case in favour of a party and for that reason the Court has to refer to those circumstances. At this stage, while disposing of the application, the Court was not required to give any objective finding one way or the other which could have prejudiced the case of the defendants. The learned Judge had not only to see the rights and the prejudices to the plaintiff, which has been completely ignored. The learned Judge could have at least mentioned in the order the circumstances on which the plaintiff relied to support his claim for an order under Section 13 (6) of the Act and the reasons that may have been given by the defendants while opposing the said application. The pleadings of the parties and the documents filed should have also been noticed by the learned Judge.
3. The impugned order whereby the plaintiff's application under Section 13 (6) of the Act was rejected can hardly be said to be a judicial order and it is clearly an arbitrary exercise of power.
4. The impugned order is, therefore, perverse and illegal and has been passed by ignoring the material on record as also the Division Bench decision of this Court in Inderlal's case (supra). The learned Judge has acted with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction. If that order is allowed to stand, it would result in failure of justice. In my opinion, the order deserves to be set aside under Section 115 of the Code That being so the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that no interference could be made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is rejected. 1967 JLJ 31, AIR 1953 SC 73 and AIR 1953 SC 677 relied on. Revision allowed.