1981 Supreme(MP) 155

H. G. Mishra, J.
Dhundasingh v. Liladhar
C. Revn. 272 of 1979 (I); Decided on 25-2-1981.

Headnote:(1) Civil P. C., 1908 -- O. 6, R. 17 and O. 43, R. 1 (r) -- application for amendment under O. 6, R. 17 -- which Court can entertain -- whether a Court hearing appeal under O. 43, R. 1 (r) can entertain it -- extent of such appeal -- what is.

        (2) Jurisdiction -- whether can be conferred by a party on a Court.

        (3) Civil P. C., 1908 -- O. 39, Rr. 1, 2 and O. 43, R. 1 -- injunction granted under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 -- appeal under O. 43, R. 1 -- scope of.

        The trial Court granted a temporary injunction by the order dated 11-7-1978. Aggrieved by this order the defendant non-applicants-herein preferred an appeal under O. 43, R. 1 (r), CPC. During the pendency of this appeal the plaintiff submitted an application for amendment of the plaint seeking impleadment of the State of Madhya Pradesh as a party to the suit. After hearing arguments on the appeal as well as on the application for amendment of the plaint, the learned District Judge has allowed the aforesaid application submitted by the plaintiff and has set aside the order for grant of injunction merely on that ground and has directed the trial Court to examine the case of grant of injunction after impleadment of the State Government as a party to the suit, in the manner indicated in the impugned order. Hence this revision.

        Held : The appeal before the learned District Judge was one under O. 43, R. 1 (r), CPC and not a regular appeal Jurisdiction of the appellate Court while deciding appeal of such a character extends only to examine the validity of an order enumerated in clause (r) of O. 43, R. 1 C. P. C. Accordingly, the scope of such appeal is limited. It extends to adjudication of challenge to an order of grant or refusal of interim injunction as envisaged by O. 43, R. 1 (r), CPC. As such, the learned District Judge has no seisin over the suit as such. He was seized of proceedings of a temporary injunction in the suit and not of the suit itself. This aspect of the law appears to have been overlooked by the learned District Judge.

        As a logical corollary flowing from the aforesaid position of law it was to be concluded that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for amendment of the plaint submitted before him by the plaintiff-applicant-herein. If the applicant-herein (plaintiff) chose to submit the application in the appeal preferred by the defendants before the learned District Judge, only courses which could have been adopted by the learned District Judge were (a) to direct the plaintiff to submit the amendment application before the trial Court; and (b) to forward it to the trial Court for decision in accordance with law after deciding the appeal on merits However, he had no jurisdiction to decide the application for amendment of the plaint on its merits.

        In view of the aforesaid discussion, it has to be concluded that the learned District Judge acted in an illegal manner and appears to have erroneously allowed amendment of the plaint submitted by the plaintiff-applicant. It is law well settled that a party cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court, which it does not possess. Accordingly, nothing turns on the fact that it was the plaintiff-applicant, who solicited amendment before the learned District Judge. It appears further that the learned District Judge acted in an illegal manner in setting aside the order passed by the trial Court granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff-applicant herein merely after allowing amendment in the plaintiff. AIR 1958 SC 394 distinguished. Revision allowed. Case remanded.