1982 Supreme(MP) 147

S. S. Sharma, J.
Narayandas v. Shri Sakal Dasha Neema.
Civil. Misc. A. No. 234 of 1980 (I); Decided on 26-2-1982.

Headnote:(1) Civil P. C., 1908 -- O. 40, R. 1-- appointment of receiver under -- when proper --defendant neither maintaining property nor putting forth any accounts plaintiffs intereat needs protection -- appointment of receiver is proper.

        (2) Civil P.C. 1908 -- O. 40, R. 1 & O. 43, R. 1-appointment of receiver -- nature of the order is discretionary -- discretion exercised neither illegal nor contrary to law -- no interference in appeal is called for.

        By this appeal, the appellant-defendants challenge the appointment of receiver on the suit property.

        Held: The appointment of a receiver under Order 40, rule 1 of the Code is essentially on equitable grounds. The words "just and convenient" as have been used in this rule have been construed to say that "it is practicable and the interests of justice require it." There is enough of material to prima facie indicate that the property in question is of the trust. The property is popularly known as Dasha Neema Panchayat Dharmshala. The appellants are disputing that the property had been given to this Samaj during the earst while Holkar State period. They have also disputed every other circumstances or evidence on which the plaintiffs rely to show that the property belongs to the Samaj. However, no cogent evidence or material has been put forth which could prima facie negative those circumstances and evidence which support the plaintiffs case.

        No material has been placed by the appellants to show that they have been maintaining the property not have they put forth any accounts with regard to the income and expenditure. In the present circumstances the rights of the plaintiffs have also to be protected by keeping the property intact. This could best be done by appointment of a receiver.

        That apart a discretion exercised by the trial Court in the matter of appointment of a receiver after considering the facts of the case ought not to be interfered with, in appeal unless it is shown that it was improperly exercised or that the determination was contrary to law. The facts of the case are of the primarily considerting which determine the exercise of the discretionary power. See Nihalchand L. Jai Narain and others v. Ram Niwas Munnalal and others (AIR 1968 P and H 523). Appeal dismissed.