1981 Supreme(MP) 220

P. D. Mulye. J.
State of M. P. v. Parasramsingh.
S. A. No. 289 of 1967 (I); Decided on 26-3-1981.

Headnote:constitution of India -- Art. 317 (1) -- power of dismissal and removal under -- does not imply that authorities mentioned in this article must alone initiate and conduct disciplinary proceedings.

        The facts giving rise to this appeal which are no longer in dispute and as also found proved on evidence, are that the plaintiffd`respondent was posted as Sub-Inspector of police at Silawad, Sub-Division Barwani, District Khargone, M. P. in 1959, that on the basis of complaints received from different persons regarding receiving of illegal gratification, beating and misbehaviour in public of the respondent, D W 4 Shri Dhillon, the Superintendent of Police, instituted an enquiry which as directed by him was conducted by Shri Chaturvedi (D W 3) the Sub-Divisional Officer, Police, that as a result of the enquiry charges of corruption had proved to obtain illegal gratification were found proved and on the basis of the finding of that report after a show cause notice the respondent appellant was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police, M. P. by his order Ex. D-13 dated 9-3-60, who was the appointing authority. According to the plaintiff respondent the Departmental Enquiry ought to have been conducted by the appointing authority, i. e., The Inspector General of Police himself and he could not delegate that authority and functions to his subordinate officials, He therefore, filed a suit for declaration and reinstatement in service on the ground that the Departmental Enquiry held against him was illegal and not in accordance with the provisions of the Police Act No.5 of 1861, which was extended to M. P. with effect from 1-1-59 and also not in accordance with rule 228 to rule 231of the CP and Berar Police Rules.

        The learned trial Court after recording evidence dismissed the plaintiffs suit. However, the learned lower appellate Court relying upon the decision reported in AIR 1966 Madhya Pradesh, 193 (Shardul Singh v. State of M P) allowed the same on the ground that it was only the appointing authority who had the jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry and that such enquiry conducted by the subordinate officials of the department was against the provisions of law, even though the learned lower appellate Court concurred with the finding of the trial Court on other issues.

        Held : The short question, which now arises for decision in this appeal is whether the Departmental Enquiry was conducted in accordance with law and the rules. The learned Government Advocate for the appellant submitted that Shardul Singhs case referred to above has been set aside by the Supreme Court, which decision has been reported in 1971 M JLJ 361 State of M. P. v. Shardul Singh where it has been held that the power conferred by Regulations 228 and 229 of the CP and Berar Police Regulations framed on the basis of S. 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935 was not ultra vires of Art, 311 (I) and that the dismissal was not illegal. Admittedly the bets of that case and the present case are also similar as in that case also the Superintendent of Police initiated a Departmental Enquiry against the petitioner who was Sub-Inspector of Police. The enquiry was actually conducted by the Dy. S. P. who after holding the enquiry concluded that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him and recommended petitioners dismissal in the report sent to the Inspector General of Police. After receiving the report from the Superintendent of Police the Inspector General of Police sent a copy of the report to the petitioner and called upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service and after considering the explanation submitted by the petitioner the Inspector General dismissed the petitioner, In that case it was contended that the dismissal was illegal as the enquiry was not initiated or conducted by ,the Inspector General of Police The decision of this Court reported in 1966 MP 193 (supra) having been set aside by the Supreme Court obviously the conclusion reached by the learned lower appellate Court, relying on the earlier decision of this Court cannot be sustained. 1971 MPLJ 363= 1970 JLJ SN 9 followed. Appeal allowed.