1982 Supreme(MP) 321

A. R. Navkar, J.
Shri Ramkrishan Trading Co. v. Smt. Shakuntla Devi.
Cr. R. No. 348 of 1982 (G); Decided on 28-6-1982.

Headnote:(1) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP) -- S. 12 (1) (a) -- eviction suit under -- decree for arrears of rent also claimed in alternative -- Court fees on such arrears should be prepaid -- Court fees.

        (2) Civil Courts Act, 1958 (MP) -- Ss.7 (2) and 15 -- distribution memo prepared by district Judge -- nature of -- it is not merely a ministerial act but having force of law.

        (3) Court - fees -- suit for eviction -- decree for arrears of rent also claimed In alternative -- payment of Court -- fees on such arrears Is necessary.

        The short facts of the case are that the plaintiff non-applicant is the owner of the disputed sh0p,situa1ed in Maira-Wali Gali, lashkar and the defendant-applicant is her tenant al the rate of Rs. 250 per month. It is alleged that the defendant has not paid the rent from 8-1-1980 to 8-4-1981, and the total amount comes to Rs. 3,750. It is further alleged that this amount of arrears of rent was not paid in spite of a notice of demand served on the defendant, The plaintiff has valued the suit at 4,200 for eviction purposes. In the plaint, it is mentioned that if the defendant wants protection under section 13 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act,) then he will have to deposit the amount of arrears of rent in the Court. It is also alleged that if the defendant fails to deposit the said amount, then a decree for that amount be passed and the plaintiff will pay the required Court-fees subsequently.

        The defendant-applicant has not filed his written statement but be has raised objection that the Court-fees, paid by the plaintiff, is not sufficient and be will have to pay the Court-fees on the relief of arrears of rent. Further, it was submitted that if the amount is added together, the valuation of the suit will be more and as such the learned trial Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and as such it is alleged that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff for proper valuation and then to file it in the Court having jurisdiction.

        Held : The learned counsel for the defendant-applicant has submitted before me that the order of the learned First Appellate Court that the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit is not proper and it has not taken into account the decision, given by this Court, as reported in 1975 JLJ 252 (Balmukunda. v. Rameshchand and others), in which it was observed as under:-

        "It would be incorrect to say that the distribution "memo is merely a ministerial or administrative order having no force of law the memo is in fact an order passed by the District Judge in exercise of his statutory powers under sub-section (3) of section 7 and section 15 of the Act and as such bas the force of law"

        If the observations are taken into consideration, then in my opinion the order of the first Appellate Court cannot be held to be proper.

        The learned counsel for the non-applicant has vehemently argued before me that there is no need of paying Court-fees for the amount of arrears of rent, as has been held by the Courts below. It has been alleged in the plaint that if the defendant fails to deposit the amount of arrears of rent, a decree for the said amount be also passed in favour of the plaintiff and he will pay the Court fees subsequently. This sort of prayer, which, amounts for asking for arrears of rent, even though made in a very clear language, cannot be said to be sufficient so as to evade the payment of Court fee and, in my opinion, payment of Court-fees, arrears of rent is absolutely essential and the order of the Courts below in this regard is correct. If the plaintiff does not want to pay the Court-fee for the said relief, then she will have to delete the said prayer for passing a decree for arrears of rent.

        As to the other aspect, regarding distribution memo, I have already held that the distribution memo is, in fact, not only a ministerial or administrative order, but has also the force of law and as such the order of the learned First Appellate Court that the matter may be referred to the District Judge, then the case may be filed, as per order of the District Judge, cannot stand. 1975 JLJ 252 relied on. Revision partly allowed.