1985 Supreme(MP) 278

K. M. Agarwal, J.
Gopaldas v. Lakhmichand.
S. A. No. 47 of 1982 (G); Decided on 16-4-1985.

Headnote:(1) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M. P.) -- S. 12 (1) (a) (b) and (f) -- suit for eviction -- grounds under S. 12 (1) (a) and (b) became futile -- another ground under S. 12 (1) (f) added -- such addition is not bon fide.

        (2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M. P.) -- S. 12 (1) (f) -- ground of eviction added after lapse of considerable time when suit itself became futile -- such amendment should not he allowed.

        (3) Civil P. C., 1908 -- O. 6, R. 17 -- amendment sought to continue a dead suit -- such amendment should be refused.

        (4) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M. P.) -- S. 12 (1) (f) and Transfer of Property Act, 1882 -- S. 111 -- eviction suit before expiry of period of lease -- suit is premature.

        This appeal was admitted on 12-3-1982 on the following substantial questions of law:

       (i) Whether the appellate Court acted illegally in rejecting the application of the appellant under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC by which appellant sought to incorporate facts based on subsequent event to nullify the so-called need of the plaintiff ?

       (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, as stated in the memo of appeal, the method adopted by the Courts below for coming to a finding about genuine requirement is perverse and against the record ?

       (iii) Whether the learned first appellate Court erred in passing any order on the application of the appellant filed under Order 12, Rule 4, CPC, by which certain crucial facts which would have resulted the finding, were sought to be admitted or denied by the respondent?

        Held : After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the said question of law at SI. No. (ii) must be decided in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. It is manifest that the suit for ejectment was not maintainable, because on the date of suit the period of lease as per clause (1) of the lease deed (Ext. P-1) has not come to an end. No decree for ejectment on the ground under S 12 (1) (a) of the Act could have been passed against the appellant because he had, admittedly, complied with the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act. Similarly, on the ground of sub-letting, no decree for ejectment could have been passed in favour of the respondent in view of the fact that in terms of clause (2) of the lease deed, the appellant was within his right in sub-letting the suit accommodation. Further, no reason was given by the respondent, as to why the claim for ejectment under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was added after a delay of about one or one and a half years from the date of accrual of the alleged need. These circumstances do show that the alleged need of the respondent under section 12 (1)(f) of the Act was a cooked up ground for obtaining ejectment of the appellant from the suit accommodation. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the method adopted by the Courts below for coming to a finding about genuine requirement of the respondent was perverse and bad in law and, consequently, the impugned decree for ejectment is liable to be set aside.

        It may also be noted that soon after the compliance with section 13 (1) of the Act, the suit of the respondent on the ground under sec. 12 (1) (a) of the Act had become infructuous. Similarly, the claim for ejectment on the ground of sub-letting, i.e., under section 12 (1) (b) of the Act was also liable to be dismissed on the face of clause (2) of the lease deed (Ext. P-1) under the circumstances, soon after the compliance of section 13 (1) of the Act by the appellant, the respondents suit was, liable to be dismissed. However, if it was wrongly allowed to continue, it did not furnish any right to the respondent to amend his plaint/pleadings and thereby set up a new ground for ejectment under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The very manner in which the suit was filed and conducted by the respondent, left no room for doubt that the respondent was bent upon obtaining a decree for ejectment against the appellant on one ground or the other. Further, it cannot be disputed that an amendment relates back to the date of suit. As earlier pointed out, the suit was premature, because it was filed before the expiry of the period of lease, as mentioned in clause (1) of the lease deed (Ext. P-1). under the circumstances, no decree on the ground under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act could have been legally passed in favour of the respondent. Appeal allowed.