1985 Supreme(MP) 378

Rampal Singh J.
Ramesh Baboo v. Moolchand.
C. R. 308 of 1980; Decided on 6-8-1985.

Headnote:Civil P. C., 1908 -- S. 115 -- revisional jurisdiction under -- exercise of -- shall not be exercised even if impugned order is wrong or against law if trial Court has jurisdiction to pass such orders.

        These revision petitions were admitted by this Court on 18-11-1980 for final hearing. Therefore, I shall refrain from passing any order on the maintainability of these revision petitions, and shall deal with the merits of the grievance made by the decree-holder-applicant before this Court. Assuming that these petitions are maintainable, assuming that they have merits. assuming that the matter is pending for more than 5 years in this Court or that Court and also assuming that the decree-holder-applicant with an empty decree is unable to enjoy its usufruct, I shall confine myself with the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

        Held : The contentions of the decree-holder-applicant may be true, but, by the impugned order, the Third Civil Judge Class I has only ordered that his previous order dated 30-11-1979, against which no appeal was preferred by the decree-holder-applicant, cannot be reviewed. He further held in the brief order that even though the tenant objectors, have no prima facie case in their favour, evidence has to be recorded. It has been brought to my notice that the executing Court has started recording the evidence and it was only in the middle of recording the evidence that these revision petitions were preferred.

        The revisional jurisdiction of this Court is described under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It provides that the High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where--

       (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the other party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings;

       (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.

       It further lays down that this Court shall not under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.

        Let us examine whether the impugned order is in accordance with the above-noted principle or not. By the impugned order, the Third Civil Judge Class I has simply main tamed what he decided on 30-11-1979. An appeal could lie against that order, but it was not preferred by the decree-holder-applicant. Thus, according to sub-section (2) of section 115, the High Court shall not vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies. As stated above, an appeal could have been preferred against the order dated 30-11-1979. But it was not done. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court, as stated hereinabove, cannot be exercised where the lower Court bas exercised its discretion in a matter. To record evidence or not to record it is purely a discretionary matter in the hands of the lower Court. Such discretionary orders, as in the present case, can be interfered with only when the lower Court has acted on wrong principles, or this Court is satisfied that the order of the lower Court is not supported by any consideration of justice or by any provision of law. Where there is no patent violation of any provision of law in the exercise of the discretion, or there is no perversity manifested in the order, this Court, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, cannot interfere. The jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of civil revision has been well settled by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in AIR 1966 SC 153; AIR 1971 SC 2324 and AIR 1973 SC 76. Thus, according to the settled law, even if the trial Courts order is wrong or is not in accordance with law, one thing is clear that if it has the jurisdiction to pass that order, this Court shall not exercise its revisional jurisdiction. If it does, then it is an illegality. Thus, the impugned order may be against law, it may be wrong, it may not be in accordance with law, but the lower Court has exercised the jurisdiction vested in it properly. Assuming that the impugned order is wrong and assuming that by the impugned order justice is delayed and the rightful owner is kept away from enjoying the usufruct of the decree, that has been passed in his favour, on account of the long-drawn litigation, but that is not sufficient for this Court to interfere with the exercise of the discretion done by the executing Court in the impugned order. AIR 1966 SC 153; AIR 1971 SC 2324 and AIR 1973 SC 76 followed. Revision dismissed.