1992 Supreme(MP) 338
K.M. Agarwal and R.D. Shukla, JJ.
R.P. Sharma v. Competent Authority
M.P. No. 424 of 1992 (J); Decided on 23.6.1992.
Mohan Tamaskar for petitioner; G.K. Soni for respondents.
Headnote:(1) Lok Parisar (Bedakhli) Adhiniyam, 1974 (M.P.) -- S. 2 (e) (amended) -- public premises" as defined -- includes premises belonging to local authority.
(2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) -- S. 20 - suit for eviction under -- can be filed only on the grounds mentioned in the provision.
¼1½ yksd ifjlj ¼csn[kyh½ vf/kfu;e] 1974 ¼e-iz-½& &/kkjk 2¼³½ ¼la‘kksf/kr½& ;Fkk ifjHkkf"kr ^^yksd ifjlj** esa LFkkuh; izkf/kdkjh ds ifjlj Hkh lfEefyr gSA
¼2½ LFkku fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 1961 ¼e-iz-½& &/kkjk 20 & ds v/khu csn[kyh ds fy, okn &dsoy mica/k esa mfYyf[kr vk/kkjksa ij gh Qkby fd;k tk ldrk gSA
The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Lok Parisar Adhiniyam was not applicable to accommodations belonging to a Municipal Council. He placed reliance in Jethanand v. Nagar Palika, Mandsaur, 1980 JU 494 in support of his contention. Section 2 (e) of the Lok Parisar Adhiniyam was amended by M.P. Act No. 18 of 1981, but according to the learned counsel, the amendment did not change the situation, as held in Omprakash v. Municipal• Council, Barwaha, 1982 M.P.W.N. Note No. 113 by a Single Bench of this Court. It was further argued that by following the special provision for recovery of possession of certain accommodation provided in section 20 of the M.P.AC. Act, the respondent could obtain possession of the disputed accommodation, as those provisions were applicable even to the accommodations belonging to local authorities. It was submitted that these provisions were also held to be valid in Hari Shankar Soni v. State, 1991 JLJ 506.
Held: Having considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and for that of the respondent No.2 we have come to the conclusion that this petition has no substance and deserves to be summarily dismissed. The first decision of this Court in Jethanand v. Nagar Palika, Mandsaur (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners needs no consideration and may be overlooked in view of the fact that it was prior to the amendment made in section 2 (e) of the Lok Parisar Adhiniyam made by M.P. Act No. 18/81. After the amendment is section 2 (e), the definition of "public premises" under the Adhiniyam is as follows :--
Public premises means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State Government, and includes any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of -
(i) any company as defined in section 3, of the Companies Act, 1956 (No.1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government, and;
(ii) any Corporation not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (No.1 of 1956) established by or under a Central or State Act and owned or controlled by the State Government or a local authority."
Sub-clause (ii) of clause (e) of section 2 of the Adhiniyam provides that after the amendment Corporation includes any body established by or under a Central or State Act and owned or controlled by the State Government or a local authority. Municipal Council, the respondent No.2, is a creation of a statute and, therefore, the accommodation belonging to it would now be included within the meaning of "public premises as given in the amended section 2 (e) of the Adhiniyam. The decision of this Court in Om prakash v. Municipal Council, Barwaha (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be quite distinguishable. It appears that a civil suit for ejectment was filed by Municipal Council, Barwaha against Omprakash prior to the amendment of section 2 (e) of the Adhiniyam. In that suit an objection was raised on behalf of the tenant that the suit was not tenable is the suit accommodation fell within the definition of "public premises" under section 2 (e) of the Adhiniyam and, therefore, the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit by virtue of section 15 thereof. The objection was overruled by the trial Court and in Civil revision this Court upheld the order made by the trial Court by holding that the Adhiniyam was not applicable. This Court relied on the earlier decision of this Court in Jethanand (supra). While doing so, it observed that the amendment affected in section 2 (e) of the Adhiniyam by Act No. 18/81 reinforced the conclusions reached by this Court in the case of Jethanand. In substance, it appeared that this Court was of the view that if the accommodation belonging to any local authority was covered by the amended provision of section 2 (e) of the Adhiniyam, there was no necessity to amend the definition of "public premises" given in section 2 (e) of the Adhiniyam. Accordingly, we are of the view that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that even after amendment of section 2 (e) of the Adhiniyam, the situation remained as it was on the date of the decision of this Court in Jethanand cannot be sustained.
So far as provisions of section 20 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act are concerned, they relate to cases in which eviction of the tenant is sought on one or other of the grounds mentioned in section 20 thereof. In the present case, none of the grounds mentioned in section 20 of M.P.A.C. Act appeared to exist in favour of respondent No.2 and, therefore, that argument also deserves to be rejected. We may also observe that the respondent No.2 is not trying to obtain possession of the disputed accommodation otherwise than in accordance with law, therefore, that decree would also not come in the way of eviction proceedings which have been started by the respondent No. 1 under the provisions of Lok Parisar Adhiniyam. 1980 JLJ 494 and 1982 MPWN 113 distinguished. 1991 JLJ 506 referred to. Petition dismissed.