1992 Supreme(MP) 781

(SUPREME COURT)
A. M. Ahmadi and M. M. Punchhi, JJ.
A. A. Haja Muniuddin v. Indian Railways
C. A. No. 4865 of 1992; Decided on 17.11.1992*.

Headnote:(1) Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 -- Ss. 13, 16 (2) and 18 -- claim for compensation under S. 13 -- Tribunal can exempt payment of court-fees on the principles of O. 33, C. P.C.

        (2) Civil P. C., 1908 -- O. 33 -- provisions under -- apply to claim petition under Railway Claims Tribunal Act.

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        ¼2½ lk{; vf/kfu;e] 1872 & vuq- 33 & mica/k & jsy nkok vf/kdj.k vf/kfu;e ds v/khu nkok vthZ ij ykxw gksrs gSA

        The short question which arises for determination in this appeal is whether an indigent person who is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 16 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act 1987 (hereinafter called the Act) can be permitted to prefer his claim as an indigent person on the principle embodied in Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called the Code ).

        Held : Section 30 empowers the Central Government to make rules. In exercise of this power the Central Government made the rules referred to above and brought them into force from the appointed day i.e. the date with effect from which the Claims Tribunal came to be established under section 3 of the Act. Rule 6 which is relevant for our purpose provides that every application made under sub-section (1) of section 16 for seeking relief in respect of matters, other than claim of compensation for death or injuries to passengers, shall be accompanied by a fee as specified in Schedule II. Rule 44 lays down that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Tribunal.

        It will be seen from the scheme of the Act that on its coming into force from the appointed day, all suits pending in the civil Court would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal if the cause of action of the suit would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after the appointed day. Therefore, even as it filed under the provisions of Order XXXIII would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal and the Claims Tribunal would be required to dispose it of as such. That is because section 13 specifically provides that the Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on or from the appointed day all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any civil Court provided the same relates to the recovery of compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-deLi"Very of goods entrusted to the railways for carriage by railway. Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain and try such suits on and from the appointed day. In other words after the appointed day the Claims Tribunal alone would have jurisdiction to entertain and try claims referred to in clauses (a) & (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act. Section 18 then sets out the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of section 18 states that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and shall have powers to regulate its own procedure. It is true that Sub-section (1) of Section 18 in term states that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code but that does not mean that it is precluded from invoking the procedure laid down by the Code even if the ends of justice so require. The Sub-section further states that the Tribunal shall have powers to regulate its own procedure and sub-section (3) of section 18 enumerates the matters in respect whereof the Claims Tribunal is permitted to exercise the same powers vested in a civil Court under the Code while trying a suit. Rule 44 in terms states that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Nowhere in the Act is there any provision which runs counter to or is inconsistent with the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code. Although the Act and the Rules do not specifically provide for the application of Order XXXIII of the Code, there is nothing in the Actor the Rules which precludes the Tribunal from following that procedure if the ends of justice so require. If the view taken by the Tribunal is accepted as laying down the correct law, the result would be that a claimant who has a genuine claim for compensation under the provisions of the Act would be denied access to the Claims Tribunal if he is an indigent person and does not have the means to pay the fee required on the claim-application. Before the establishment of the Claims Tribunal he would have been able to file the suit invoking Order XXXIII of the Code as an indigent person. Now that a special Claims Tribunal has been established under the Act, can it be said that indigent persons who do not have the means to pay the fee required on the claim-application are altogether debarred from seeking compensation from the railway administration for the wrong done to them? Access to justice cannot be denied to an individual merely because he does not have the means to pay the prescribed fee. Such a view would leave indigent persons without a remedy. It is, therefore, essential that the provisions of the Act and the Rules must be broadly interpreted to ensure access to justice.

        If a claimant is left without redress even if he has a valid claim against the railway administration merely because he is an indigent person, it would be a sad day and the poor will lose confidence in the system. No one can be heard to say, much less the railway administration, that even though the claimant has a genuine claim for compensation against the railway administration, he must forgo the same if he does not have the means to pay the requisite fee. Such an interpretation which denies justice must be avoided. Section 18 (1) only says that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code but does not go so far as to say that it shall be precluded from invoking the provisions laid down by the Code even if the same is not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules. Since the Claims Tribunal is empowered to regulate its own procedure, there is nothing in the Act and the Rules which precludes the invocation of Order XXXIII of the Code. A view which advances the cause of justice must be preferred to the one which defeats it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal adopted a narrow interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act in coming to the conclusion that the Act as well as the Rules did not permit invocation of Order XXXIII of the Code. The view taken by the Tribunal results in a person not having the means to pay the fee prescribed for preferring a claim being left without a remedy. Such a view would result in gross injustice. The Tribunal has the power to lay down its own procedure and as stated earlier section 18 (1) does not preclude it from invoking the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code if the ends of justice so require. When an indigent person approaches the Tribunal for compensation for the wrong done to him, the Tribunal cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely because he does not have the means to pay the fee. In such a situation we think the ends of justice require that the Tribunal should follow the procedure laid down in Order XXXIII of the Code to do justice for which it came to be established. Appeal allowed.