This is defendant's second appeal under section 100 CPC. Arguments on the question of admission heard.

There is a concurrent finding of fact of the trial Court and the first appellate Court that the defendant took a necklace from the plaintiff on -5.3.1990 but did not return it. The defendant executed the document dated 22.3.1993 (Ex. P-1) expressly promising to return the ornament before 30.12.1993. The defendant executed another document dated 9.1.1994 (Ex. P-2) promising to return the same before 31.5.1994. The trial Court dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. The first appellate Court has decreed it.

It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff's case is not covered by section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as the acknowledgement of liability as per documents Ex. P-l and Ex. P-2 was not made 'before the expiration of the prescribed period for the suit'.

To this extent his argument is legally correct and finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sampuran Singh v. Niranjan Kaur (AIR 1999 SC 1047). In the present case there is not merely an acknowledgement but there is also a further express 'promise to pay' and that brings the case within section 25(3) of the Contract Act. It is well settled that a 'promise to pay', a time-barred debt is a good consideration under section 25(3) of the Contract Act [Vimla Pradhan v. United Commercial Bank (1991 JLJ 344 = (1990 MPLJ 819)]. A promise to pay a time-barred debt is enforceable, Time-barred debt is a good consideration for a fresh promise to pay [Bhansarlal v. Navalkishor (1957 JLJ 954 = AIR 1958 MP 21)]. Written promise to pay a time-barred debt furnishes by itself a fresh cause of action [Ghanshyamdas v. Ghasilal (1969 JLJ 426 = 1969 MPLJ 501)].

It depends upon the language of the document under consideration whether a statement contained in it is a mere acknowledgment within the meaning of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or whether it is a promise to pay within the meaning of section 25(3) of the Contract Act. In Business Forms Ltd. v. Ashoka Agencies (AIR 1996 Cal. 153) also, it has been held that a promise to pay time-barred debt contained in a letter is covered by section 25(3) of the Contract Act. To the same effect is the decision of Bombay High Court in S.E. Roadways, Bombay v. U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. (AIR 1993 Born. 300).

It is thus well settled that a promise to pay time-barred debt furnishes a fresh cause of action. The first appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff's suit was within the period of limitation. No Substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal. It is dismissed in limine.