Messrs. C. W. Ogden and J. D. Guinn for plaintiff in error.

No counsel for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action of contract brought by the plaintiff in error, [190 U.S. 540, 541] a Kentucky corporation, against the defendant in error, a Texas corporation, for breach of a contract to sell and deliver crude oil. The defendant excepted to certain allegations of damage, and pleaded that the damages had been claimed and magnified fraudulently for the purpose of giving the United States circuit court jurisdiction, when in truth they were less than $2,000. The judge sustained the exceptions. He also tried the question of jurisdiction before hearing the merits, refused the plaintiff a jury, found that the plea was sustained, and dismissed the cause. The plaintiff excepted to all the rulings and action of the court, and brings the case here by writ of error. If the rulings and findings were right, there is no question that the judge was right in dismissing the suit (North American Transp. & Trading Co. v. Morrison, 178 U.S. 262, 267, 44 S. L. ed. 1061, 1064, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 869); but the grounds upon which he went are re-examinable here. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 42 L. ed. 682, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293.

The contract was made through a broker, it would seem by writing, and, at all events, was admitted to be correctly stated in the following letter:

Dallas, Texas, 7/30/97.

Landa Oil Company,

New Braunfels, Texas.

Gentlemen:--

Referring to the exchange of our telegrams to-day, we have sold for your account to the Globe Refining Company, Louisville Kentucky, ten ( 10) tanks prime crude C/S oil at the price of 15 3/4 cents per gallon of 7 1/2 pounds, f. o. b. buyers tank at your mill. Weights and quality guaranteed.

Terms: Sight draft without exchange b/ldg. attached. Sellers paying commission.

Shipment: Part last half August and balance first half September. Shipping instructions to be furnished by the Globe Refining Company. Yours truly,

Thomas & Green, as Broker.

Having this contract before us, we proceed to consider the allegations of special damage over and above the difference between the contract price of the oil and the price at the time of the breach, which was the measure adopted by the judge. These [190 U.S. 540, 542] allegations must be read with care, for it is obvious that the pleader has gone as far as he dared to go, and to the verge of anything that could be justified under the contract, if not beyond.

It is alleged that it was agreed and understood that the plaintiff would send its tank cars to the defendants mills, and that the defendant promptly would fill them with oil (so far, simply following the contract), and that the plaintiff sent tanks. In order to do this, the plaintiff was under the necessity of obligating itself unconditionally to the railroad company (and of which the defendant had notice) to pay to it for the transportation of the cars from said Louisville to said New Braunfels in the sum of $900, which sum plaintiff had to pay, and was incurred as an advancement on said oil contract. This is the first item. The last words quoted mean only that the sum paid would have been allowed by the railroad as part payment of the return charges had the tanks been filled and sent back over the same road.

Next it is alleged that the defendant, contemplating a breach of the contract, caused the plaintiff to send its cars a thousand miles, at a cost of $1,000; that defendant canceled its contract on the 2d of September, but did not notify the plaintiff until the 14th, when, if the plaintiff had known of the cancelation, it would have been supplying itself from other sources; that plaintiff (no doubt defendant is meant) did so wilfully and maliciously, causing an unnecessary loss of $2,000.

Next it is alleged that, by reason of the breach