Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1947

See 329 U.S. 834, 67 S.Ct. 628. [329 U.S. 433, 434] Mr.Cecil A. Morgan, of Fort Worth, Tex., for petitioner.

Mr. Alfred McKnight, of Fort Worth, Tex., for respondent.

Mr. Elton M. Hyder, Jr., of Austin, Tex., for State of Texas, amicus curiae.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner and respondent entered into a written contract under which the petitioner was to transport goods for respondent by truck entirely within the State of Texas at [329 U.S. 433, 435] such rates, charges, or tariffs as may be fixed by the Railroad Commission of the State of Texas. Based on that contract petitioner applied to the Commission for a permit to operate as a contract carrier pursuant to rules of the Railroad Commission promulgated under Texas law which grants regulatory power over transportation to that Commission. Article 911b, 1 to 22b, Rev.Stat. of Tex. Petitioners application stated that the tariff to be charged for the service proposed will be that as promulgated by the Railroad Commission of Texas. After notice and hearing, at which petitioner and a representative of respondent testified, the Commission made an order which stated that After carefully considering the evidence, the laws and its own rules and regulations, the Commission was of the opinion that the character of business proposed to be done by the applicant strictly conforms with the definition of a contract carrier. The order directed that petitioner be granted a permit, which was later issued, to transport goods for respondent in Texas, but directed attention to the fact that the Commissions tariffs and orders prescribed as a minimum rate to be charged by contract carriers the rate prescribed for common motor carriers. Later, pursuant to a prearrangement, the parties entered a supplemental agreement concerning which the Railroad Commission was kept uninformed, in accordance with which respondent actually paid petitioner for carriage of its goods less than the rates prescribed for common motor carriers. About three and a half years later the petitioner filed this suit, of which the District Court had jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship, to recover the full rate fixed by prior general orders of the Commission prescribing common carrier rates as provided in the contract.

The respondents answer admitted that it had paid less than the tariff rate fixed in prior general orders, but denied [329 U.S. 433, 436] legal liability to pay that rate on several grounds. It denied that respondents rates were governed by the Commissions prior general rate orders or by the special order granting petitioner a permit as a contract carrier. It also claimed that a State two-year statute of limitations barred recovery for part of the amount claimed. It further alleged that petitioner had led respondent to believe that his type of transportation was not subject to regulation by the Railroad Commission, and that no prior general or special orders had fixed petitioners transportation rates. In reliance upon the petitioners representations, respondent alleged, it had entered into the supplemental agreement to pay less than the tariff rate here claimed. Respondent pleaded that by this conduct petitioner was estopped from claiming that the Commission had power to or had fixed a rate for petitioners transportation, or from predicating his cause of action upon the Commissions tariffs.

The District Court rejected all of respondents contentions. Citing Texas statutes, court decisions, and the Commissions practices, the District Court held that the cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations; that the Commissions prior general rate orders governed the charges to be fixed by contract carriers such as petitioner; that Texas law barred respondent from any collateral attack on the validity o