Respondents predecessors operated a coal gasification plant, which produced coal tar as a by-product, along a creek in Pennsylvania. Shortly after acquiring easements in the property along the creek, and while excavating to control flooding, the State struck a large deposit of coal tar which began to seep into the creek. Finding the tar to be a hazardous substance, the Environmental Protection Agency declared the site the Nations first Superfund site, and the State and the Federal Government together cleaned up the area. The Government reimbursed the State for cleanup costs and sued respondent to recoup those costs under 104 and 106 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9604 and 9606, claiming that respondent was liable because it and its predecessors had deposited the tar in the ground. Respondent filed a third-party complaint against the State, asserting, inter alia, that it was liable as an "owner and operator" of the site under 107(a) of CERCLA. The District Court dismissed this complaint on the ground that the States Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no clear expression of intent to hold States liable in monetary damages under CERCLA. However, after this Court vacated that decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent amendments to CERCLA made by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), the Court of Appeals held that the statutes amended language clearly rendered States liable for [491 U.S. 1, 2] monetary damages and that Congress had the power to do so under the Commerce Clause.

Held:

The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded.

832 F.2d 1343, affirmed and remanded.

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly expresses an intent to hold States liable in damages in federal court. Pp. 7-13.

(a) The statutes plain language authorizes such suits. Section 101(21)s express inclusion of States within its definition of "persons," and 101(20)(D)s plain statement that state and local governments are to be considered "owners or operators" in all but very narrow circumstances, together establish that Congress intended that States be liable for cleanup costs under 107 along with everyone else responsible for creating hazardous waste sites. The fact that 101(20)(D) uses language virtually identical to 120(a)(1)s waiver of the Federal Governments sovereign immunity is highly significant, demonstrating that Congress must have intended to override the States immunity from suit. This conclusion is not contradicted by 101(20)(D)s exclusion of States from the category of "owners and operators" when they acquire ownership or control of a site involuntarily by virtue of their function as sovereign, by 107(d)(2)s general exemption of States from liability for actions taken during cleanup of contamination generated by other persons facilities, or by 42 U.S.C. 9659(a)(1)s express reservation of States Eleventh Amendment rights in citizen suits, since those provisions would be unnecessary unless suits against States were otherwise permitted by the statute. Pp. 7-10.

(b) Pennsylvanias arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. If accepted, the contention that CERCLA creates state liability only to the Federal Government would render meaningless the 101(20)(D) language making States liable "to the same extent . . . as any nongovernmental entity, including liability for [damages]," since no explicit authorization is necessary before the Federal Government may sue a State for damages. Moreover, 101(20)(D) obviously explains and qualifies the entire definition of "owner or operator," and does not, as Pennsylvania suggests, render States liable only if th