Petitioner Sawyers conviction and death sentence for a brutal murder became final in 1984. The Federal District Court denied his habeas corpus petition, which was based in relevant part on the argument that the prosecutors closing argument during the penalty phase of his trial diminished the jurys sense of responsibility for the capital sentencing decision, in violation of this Courts 1985 decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320. While his appeal of the denial of habeas relief was pending, this Court decided Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, under which a new rule of constitutional law established after a petitioners conviction has become final may not be used to attack the conviction on federal habeas corpus unless the rule (1) places an entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of criminal law, id., at 311, or prohibits imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, or (2) applies a new watershed rule of criminal procedure that enhances accuracy and is necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding, 489 U.S., at 312-313. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, holding that Caldwell announced a new rule within the meaning of Teague and did not fall within Teagues second exception.

Held:

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, because Caldwell announced a new rule, as defined by Teague, that does not come within either of the Teague exceptions. Pp. 233-245.

(a) Caldwells result was not dictated by Eighth Amendment precedent existing at the time petitioners conviction became final. No case prior to Caldwell invalidated a prosecutorial argument as impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. The discussion of improper prosecutorial comment in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, a noncapital murder case, was based on the Due Process Clauses guarantees of fundamental fairness, not the Eighth Amendments more particular guarantees of sentencing reliability. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586; Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349; and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, earlier Eighth Amendment cases, spoke to the general issue of sentencing reliability, but not to the issue decided in Caldwell, and Teague would be meaningless if applied at such a level of generality. In 1984, from a state courts point of view, [497 U.S. 227, 228] there were indications that Caldwell was not an Eighth Amendment requirement, see California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992; Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, and there was some doubt as to this Courts view concerning a major premise of Caldwell, that misleading prosecutorial comment might cause a bias in favor of death sentences, see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, and n. 7. It cannot be said that state cases were anticipating the Caldwell rule when they prohibited similar prosecutorial statements, because their decisions were based on state law, and did not purport to construe the Eighth Amendment. Reliance on these cases misapprehends the function of federal habeas relief, which serves to ensure that state convictions comport with established federal law at the time a petitioners conviction becomes final. To the extent that post-Caldwell Louisiana cases reflect state court recognition that general Eighth Amendment principles pointed toward adoption of a Caldwell rule, or that Caldwell is congruent with preexisting state law, they cannot serve to show that Caldwell was dictated by this Courts Eighth Amendment precedents, since courts can be expected to apply principles announced in prior Eighth Amendment decisions that are susceptible to debate among reasonable minds. Petitioners argument that state courts would not have provided protection against misleading prosecutorial comment unless they h