Petitioner brought a District Court suit against various state prison officials alleging that, in violation of his constitutional rights, they used excessive force when transferring him from one cell to another. Although he waived a jury trial and initially consented to have a magistrate try the entire case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), petitioner was permitted at trial to withdraw his consent to the Magistrates jurisdiction. However, the Magistrate ruled that he was nonetheless authorized to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to submit proposed findings of fact and a recommended disposition to the court under 636(b)(1)(B), which authorizes the nonconsensual referral to magistrates for such purposes "of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement." (Emphasis added.) The District Court overruled petitioners objection to the Magistrates role and accepted the Magistrates recommended findings and judgment for defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:

Section 636(b)(1)(B) does not, as petitioner contends, permit nonconsensual referrals to a magistrate only when a prisoner challenges ongoing prison conditions, but encompasses cases alleging a specific episode of unconstitutional conduct by prison administrators. Pp. 138-144.

(a) Although the most natural reading of the phrase "challenging conditions of confinement," when viewed in isolation, would not include suits seeking relief from isolated episodes of unconstitutional conduct, 636(b)(1)(B)s text, when read in its entirety, suggests that Congress intended to include the two primary categories of prisoner suits - habeas corpus applications and actions for monetary or injunctive relief - and thus to authorize the nonconsensual reference of all prisoner petitions to a magistrate. This interpretation is bolstered by Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-499, which, just three years before 636(b)(1)(B) was drafted, described the same two broad categories of prisoner petitions and unambiguously embraced challenges to specific instances of unconstitutional conduct within "conditions of confinement." The fact that Congress may have used the latter term to mean ongoing situations in other legislation having a different purpose cannot alter the interpretation of the 636(b)(1)(B) language that so clearly parallels the Preiser opinion. Moreover, adoption of the Preiser definition comports with [500 U.S. 136, 137] 636(b)(1)(B)s central purpose of assisting federal judges in handling an ever-increasing caseload. Pp. 138-144.

(b) Petitioner argues that, because a prisoner is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in a damages action arising out of a specific episode of misconduct, it is unlikely that Congress would authorize a nonconsensual reference in such a case to a magistrate who may not conduct a jury trial. This argument is not persuasive. Petitioners statutory reading concededly would not eliminate in all actions the potential constitutional difficulty he identifies. More important, the statute, properly interpreted, is not constitutionally infirm in cases like this one, in which the plaintiff waived the right to a jury trial, nor in cases in which the jury right exists and is not waived, in which the lower courts, guided by the principle of constitutional avoidance, have consistently held that the statute does not authorize reference to a magistrate. P. 144.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion or a unanimous Court.

Christopher D. Cerf argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Joel I. Klein.

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Aaron S. Bayer, Deputy Attorney General, and Steven R. Strom, Assistant Attorney General.

JUSTICE STE