Petitioner, a registered Honolulu voter, filed suit against respondent state officials, claiming that Hawaiis prohibition on write-in voting violated his rights of expression and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court ultimately granted his motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prohibition, taken as part of the States comprehensive election scheme, does not impermissibly burden the right to vote.

Held:

Hawaiis prohibition on write-in voting does not unreasonably infringe upon its citizens rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 432-442.

(a) Petitioner assumes erroneously that a law that imposes any burden on the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. This Courts cases have applied a more flexible standard: a court considering a state election law challenge must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justification for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-789. Under this standard, a regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance only when it subjects the voters rights to "severe" restrictions. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289. If it imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon those rights, the States important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Anderson, supra, 460 U.S., at 788. Pp. 432-434.

(b) Hawaiis write-in vote prohibition imposes a very limited burden upon voters rights to associate politically through the vote and to have candidates of their choice placed on the ballot. Because the States election laws provide easy access to the primary ballot until the cut-off date for the filing of nominating petitions, two months before the primary, any burden on the voters rights is borne only by those who fail to identify their candidate of choice until shortly before the primary. An [504 U.S. 428, 429] interest in making a late, rather than an early, decision is entitled to little weight. Cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736. Pp. 434-439.

(c) Hawaiis asserted interests in avoiding the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election and in guarding against "party raiding" during the primaries are legitimate, and are sufficient to outweigh the limited burden that the write-in voting ban imposes upon voters. Pp. 439-440.

(d) Indeed, the foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that where, as here, a States ballot access laws pass constitutional muster as imposing only reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, a write-in voting prohibition will be presumptively valid, since any burden on the right to vote for the candidate of ones choice will be light, and normally will be counterbalanced by the very state interests supporting the ballot access scheme. Pp. 441-442.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and OCONNOR, SCALIA, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 442.

Arthur N. Eisenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, Mary Blaine Johnston, Carl Varady, Paul W. Kahn, Lawrence G. Sager, Burt Neuborne, and Alan B. Burdick, pro se.

Steven S. Michaels, Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Warren Price III, Attorney General, and Girard D. Lau, Deputy Attorney General.*

[Footnote *]