In February, 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. The DEA knew that he was later imprisoned in Panama, but after requesting that he be expelled back to the United States, never followed up on his status. Once the DEA discovered that he had left Panama for Colombia, it made no further attempt to locate him. Thus, it was unaware that he reentered this country in 1982 and subsequently married, earned a college degree, found steady employment, lived openly under his own name, and stayed within the law. The Marshals Service eventually located him during a simple credit check on individuals with outstanding warrants. He was arrested in September, 1988, 8 1/2 years after his indictment. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Governments failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the District Court denied the motion, and he entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:

The delay between Doggetts indictment and arrest violated his right to a speedy trial. His claim meets the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, criteria for evaluating speedy trial claims. First, the extraordinary 8 1/2-year lag between his indictment and arrest clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry. Second, the Government was to blame for the delay. The District Courts finding that the Government was negligent in pursuing Doggett should be viewed with considerable deference, and neither the Government nor the record provides any reason to reject that finding. Third, Doggett asserted in due course his right to a speedy trial. The courts below found that he did not know of his indictment before his arrest, and, in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, the Government essentially conceded this point. Finally, the negligent delay between Doggetts indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability to prepare an adequate defense. The Government errs in arguing that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect a defendants interest in fair adjudication. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-323; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8; United States v. Loud Hauk, 474 U.S. 302, 312, [505 U.S. 647, 648] distinguished. Nor does Doggetts failure to cite any specifically demonstrable prejudice doom his claim, since excessive delay can compromise a trials reliability in unidentifiable ways. Presumptive prejudice is part of the mix of relevant Barker factors, and increases in importance with the length of the delay. Here, the Governments egregious persistence in failing to prosecute Doggett is sufficient to warrant granting relief. The negligence caused delay six times as long as that generally deemed sufficient to trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice is neither extenuated, as by Doggetts acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted. Pp. 651-658.

906 F.2d 578, reversed and remanded.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. OCONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 658. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 659.

Wm. J. Sheppard reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Elizabeth L. White.

Deputy Solicitor General Bryson reargued the cause for the United States. Assistant Attorney General Mueller argued the cause for the United States on the original argument. With them on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Ronald J. Mann, and Patty Merkamp Stemler.

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider whether the delay of 8 1/2 years between petitioners indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right