PER CURIAM.

Applying the prevailing legal standard, it is "particularly egregious" to enter a stay on second or subsequent habeas petitions unless "there are substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted." Herrera v. Collins, ___ U.S. ___ (1993) (internal quotations omitted) (OCONNOR, J., concurring, joined by KENNEDY, J.). No substantial grounds were presented in the present case. The District Court stated that the "facts in Herrera mirror those in the present case." Blair v. Delo, No. 93-0674-CV-5 (W.D.Mo. July 19, 1993). This assessment was not even questioned by the Court of Appeals, and is obviously correct. There is therefore no conceivable need for the Court of Appeals to engage in "more detailed study" over the next five weeks to resolve this claim. See Blair v. Delo, No. 93-2824 (CA8 July 20, 1993).

It is an abuse of discretion for a federal court to interfere with the orderly process of a states criminal JUSTICE system in a case raising claims that are for all relevant purposes indistinguishable from those we recently rejected in Herrera. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals stay must be vacated.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.

The Court errs twice in granting the States application to vacate the Court of Appeals stay of execution. First, it errs by affording insufficient deference to the Court of Appeals decision. Second, it errs by letting stand the District Courts decision, which was itself erroneous.

The standard under which we consider motions to vacate stays of execution is deferential, and properly so. Only when the lower courts have clearly abused their discretion in granting a stay should we take the extraordinary step of overturning such a decision.

Dugger v. Johnson, 485 U.S. 945, 947 (1988) (OCONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting). Accord, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983); Wainwright v. Spenkelink, 442 U.S. 901, 905 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). In this case, the Court of Appeals granted a temporary stay of execution to allow it time properly to consider Blairs appeal. In my view, its decision to do so does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

The State likens this case to Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320 (1990), in which this Court vacated a stay of execution because the prisoners habeas petition "clearly constitute[d] an abuse of the writ." Id. at 321. Although the habeas petition currently before the Court of Appeals is Blairs third, the abuse of the writ doctrine cannot serve as the basis for vacating this stay. Blairs principal contention in his federal habeas petition is that he is actually innocent, and this Court has recognized an exception to the abuse of the writ doctrine where a habeas petitioner can show that he probably is innocent. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. ___ (1991).

The Courts second error is that it lets stand the District Courts decision denying Blairs claim without an evidentiary hearing. In Herrera v. Collins, ___ U.S. ___ (1993), this Court assumed

that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.

Id. at at ___. The Court provided little guidance about what sort of showing would be "truly persuasive." Yet despite the uncertain contours of this constitutional right, federal courts have an obligation to treat actual-innocence claims just as they would any other constitutional claim brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The rules governing federal habeas, not addressed by the Herrera majority, provide that

[a] district court may summarily dismiss a habeas petition only if "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." 28 U.S.C. 2254 Rule 4.

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