Four months after petitioner McNeil, proceeding without counsel, filed this Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit for money damages arising from his alleged injury by the United States Public Health Service, he submitted a claim for such damages to the Department of Health and Human Services, which promptly denied the claim. The District Court subsequently dismissed McNeils complaint as premature under an FTCA provision, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), which requires that a claimant exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, although decisions in other Circuits have permitted a prematurely filed FTCA action to proceed if no substantial progress has taken place in the litigation before the administrative remedies are exhausted.

Held:

An FTCA action may not be maintained when the claimant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, but did so before substantial progress was made in the litigation. Section 2675(a)s unambiguous text - which commands that an action shall not be instituted . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate . . . agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency - requires rejection of McNeils contention that his action was timely because it was commenced when he lodged his complaint with the District Court. The complaint was filed too early, since McNeils claim had not previously been presented to the Public Health Service nor "finally denied" by that agency. Also unpersuasive is McNeils argument that his action was timely because it should be viewed as having been "instituted" on the date when his administrative claim was denied. In its statutory context, the normal interpretation of the word "institute" is synonymous with the words "begin" and "commence." The most natural reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process. Moreover, given the clarity of the statutory text, it is certainly not a "trap for the unwary." Pp. 110-113.

964 F.2d 647, affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. [508 U.S. 106, 107]

Allen E. Shoenberger, by appointment of the Court, 507 U.S. 906, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

William K. Kelley argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney, Mark B. Stern, and Henry D. Gabriel.*

[Footnote *] Joseph A. Power, Jr., and Arthur H. Bryant filed a brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P. C., as amicus curiae urging reversal.

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that an "action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages" unless the claimant has first exhausted his administrative remedies.1 The question presented is whether such an action may be maintained when the claimant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, but did so before substantial progress was made in the litigation.

On March 6, 1989, petitioner, proceeding without counsel, lodged a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the United States Public Health Service had caused him serious injuries while "conducting human research and experimentation on prisoners" in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. He [508 U.S. 106, 108] invoked the federal courts jurisdiction under the FTCA and prayed for a judgment of $20 million. App. 3-7.

Four months later, on July 7, 1989, petitioner submitted a claim for damages to the Department of Health and Human Services.2 The Department denied the claim on July 21, 1989. On August 7, 1989, p