In the Oklahoma state courts, petitioners successfully challenged certain state taxes as violating the dormant commerce clause. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered respondents to award refunds pursuant to state law, but declined to award declaratory or injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or attorneys fees under 1988. The court reasoned that because adequate remedies existed under state law, the Tax Injunction Act would have precluded petitioners from seeking an injunction in federal court; although that Act does not apply to state courts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court invoked the principle of "intrastate uniformity" to conclude that petitioners were not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief under 1983.

Held:

1. Section 1983 provides no basis for courts to issue injunctive or declaratory relief in state tax cases when there is an adequate remedy at law. This Court has long held that courts should adopt a hands-off approach with respect to state tax administration. Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110. In passing 1983, Congress did not limit this strong background principle of noninterference with state taxation. Construing 1983 with this principle of noninterference in mind, the Court concludes that 1983 does not call for courts - whether federal or state - to disrupt state tax administration by issuing injunctive or declaratory relief when state law furnishes an adequate legal remedy. Pp. 6-10.

2. Since no relief could be awarded under 1983, no attorneys fees can be awarded under 1988. P. 10.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion. [ NATIONAL TRUCK COUN. v. OKLA. TAX COMMN, ___ U.S. ___ (1995), 1]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In the Oklahoma state courts, petitioners successfully challenged certain Oklahoma taxes as violating the "dormant" commerce clause. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered respondents to award refunds pursuant to state law, it also held that petitioners were not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and, accordingly, that they could not obtain attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) (1988 ed., Supp. V). Petitioners argue that this holding violates the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. We affirm.

In 1983, Oklahoma imposed third-structure taxes against motor carriers with vehicles registered in any of 25 States.1 It did so in order to retaliate against those States that had imposed discriminatory taxes against [ NATIONAL TRUCK COUN. v. OKLA. TAX COMMN, ___ U.S. ___ (1995), 2] trucks registered in Oklahoma. In December 1984, petitioners filed a class action in an Oklahoma trial court, arguing that the taxes violated the dormant commerce clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2, cl. 1. Pursuant to state law and 1983, petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as refunds of taxes paid. In addition, they sought attorneys fees under both state law and 1988.2

The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the taxes, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and held that the taxes were invalid under our dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Commn, 806 P.2d 598 (1990). The court awarded refunds under state law, but declined to award relief under 1983 and declined to award attorneys fees under 1988. In so ruling, it relied on Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (CA8), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984), which held that 1983 may not be used to secure remedies for dormant commerce clause violations.

After the Oklahoma Supreme Courts decision, we held that one of the "rights, privileges or immunities" protected by 1983 was the right to be free from state [ NATIONAL TRUCK COUN. v. OKLA. TAX COMMN, ___ U.S