Per Curiam.

In these two cases, two panels of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that sentencing courts could not consider conduct of the defendants underlying charges of which they had been acquitted. United States v. Watts, 67 F. 3d 790 (CA9 1995) ("Watts"); United States v. Putra, 78 F. 3d 1386 (CA9 1996) ("Putra"). Every other Court of Appeals has held that a sentencing court may do so, if the Government establishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. 1 The Government filed a single petition for certiorari seeking review of both cases, pursuant to this Courts Rule 12.4, to resolve this split. Because the panels holdings conflict with the clear implications of 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 3661, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Courts decisions, particularly Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. ___ (1995), we grant the petition and reverse in both cases.

In Watts, police discovered cocaine base in a kitchen cabinet and two loaded guns and ammunition hidden in a bedroom closet of Watts house. A jury convicted Watts of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 841(a)(1), but acquitted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense, in violation of 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 924(c). Despite Watts acquittal on the firearms count, the District Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense. In calculating Watts sentence, the court therefore added two points to his base offense level under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Section(s) 2D1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 1995) (USSG). The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that "a sentencing judge may not, `under any standard of proof, rely on facts of which the defendant was acquitted." 67 F. 3d, at 797 (quoting United States v. Brady, 928 F. 2d 844, 851, and n. 12 (CA9 1991), abrogated on other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)) (emphasis added in Watts). The Government argued that the District Court could have enhanced Watts sentence without considering facts "necessarily rejected" by the jurys acquittal on the Section(s) 924(c) charge because the sentencing enhancement did not require a connection between the firearm and the predicate offense, whereas Section(s) 924(c) did. The court rejected this argument, stated that both the enhancement and Court had impermissibly "reconsider[ed] facts that the jury necessarily rejected by its acquittal of the defendant on another count." 67 F. 3d, at 796.

In Putra, authorities had videotaped two transactions in which Putra and a codefendant (a major drug dealer) sold cocaine to a government informant. The indictment charged Putra with, among other things, one count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine on May 8, 1992; and a second count of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on May 9, 1992, both in violation of 21 U. S. C. Section(s) 841(a)(1) and 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 2. The jury convicted Putra on the first count but acquitted her on the second. At sentencing, however, the District Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Putra had indeed been involved in the May 9 transaction. The District Court explained that the second sale was relevant conduct under USSG Section(s) 1B1.3, and it therefore calculated Putras base offense level under the Guidelines by aggregating the amounts of both sales. As in Watts, the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for resentencing. Reasoning that the jurys verdict of acquittal manifested an "explicit rejection" of Putras involvement in the May 9 transaction, the Court of Appeals held that "allowing an increase in Putras sentence would be effectively punishing her for an offense for which she has been acquitted." 78 F.