Petitioner California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit association of local dental societies to which about three-quarters of the States dentists belong, provides desirable insurance and preferential financing arrangements for its members, and engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for members benefit. Members agree to abide by the CDAs Code of Ethics, which, inter alia, prohibits false or misleading advertising. The CDA has issued interpretive advisory opinions and guidelines relating to advertising. Respondent Federal Trade Commission brought a complaint, alleging that the CDA violated §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Act), 15 U. S. C. §45, in applying its guidelines so as to restrict two types of truthful, nondeceptive advertising: price advertising, particularly discounted fees, and advertising relating to the quality of dental services. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held the Commission to have jurisdiction over the CDA and found a §5 violation. As relevant here, the Commission held that the advertising restrictions violated the Act under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit sustained the Commissions jurisdiction and concluded that an abbreviated or "quick look" rule-of-reason analysis was proper in this case.

Held:

1. The Commissions jurisdiction extends to an association that, like the CDA, provides substantial economic benefit to its for-profit members. The Act gives the Commission authority over a "corporatio[n]," 15 U. S. C. §45(a)(2), "organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members," §44. The Commissions claim that the Act gives it jurisdiction over nonprofit associations whose activities provide substantial economic benefits to their for-profit members is clearly the better reading of the Act, which does not require that a supporting organization must devote itself entirely to its members profits or say anything about how much of the entitys activities must go to raising the members bottom lines. There is thus no apparent reason to let the Acts application turn on meeting some threshold percentage of activity for this purpose or even a softer formulation calling for a substantial part of the entitys total activities to be aimed at its members pecuniary benefit. The Act does not cover all membership organizations of profit-making corporations without more. However, the economic benefits conferred upon CDAs profit-seeking professionals plainly fall within the object of enhancing its members "profit," which is the Acts jurisdictional touchstone. The Acts logic and purpose comport with this result, and its legislative history is not inconsistent with this interpretation. Pp. 7-11.

2. Where any anticompetitive effects of given restraints are far from intuitively obvious, the rule of reason demands a more thorough enquiry into the consequences of those restraints than the abbreviated analysis the Ninth Circuit performed in this case. Pp. 11-24.

(a) An abbreviated or "quick-look" analysis is appropriate when an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85. This case fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is comparably obvious, for the CDAs advertising restrictions might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect or possibly no effect at all on competition. Pp. 11-14.

(b) The discount and nondiscount advertising restrictions are, on their face, designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising in a market characterized by striking disparities bet