A New York trial court orally denied respondents 1995 motion to vacate his state conviction. Subsequently, the Federal District Court dismissed respondents federal habeas petition as untimely, noting that it was filed more than one year after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In reversing and remanding, the Second Circuit concluded that 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2), which tolls AEDPAs limitations period during the time that a "properly filed" application for state postconviction relief is pending, also tolls the 1-year grace period which the Circuit has allowed for the filing of applications challenging pre-AEDPA convictions; that, in the absence of a written order, respondents 1995 motion was still pending under §2244(d)(2); and that the 1995 motion was properly filed because it complied with rules governing whether an application for state postconviction relief is "recognized as such" under state law. It thus rejected petitioners contention that the 1995 application was not properly filed because the claims it contained were procedurally barred under New York law.

Held: That respondents application for state postconviction relief contained procedurally barred claims does not render it improperly filed under §2244(d)(2). An application is "filed," as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record; and it is "properly filed" when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings, e.g., requirements concerning the form of the document, applicable time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and payment of a filing fee. By construing "properly filed application" to mean application "raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred," petitioner elides the difference between an "application" and a "claim." The state procedural bars at issue set forth conditions to obtaining relief, rather than conditions to filing. Pp. 4-7.

199 F. 3d 116, affirmed.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 2244(d)(2) of Title 28 U. S. C. (1994 ed., Supp. IV) provides that "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." This case presents the question whether an application for state postconviction relief containing claims that are procedurally barred is "properly filed" within the meaning of this provision.

I

After a 1984 jury trial in the Supreme Court of New York, Queens County, respondent was convicted of attempted murder, criminal possession of a weapon, reckless endangerment, criminal possession of stolen property, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. After unsuccessfully pursuing state postconviction relief in 1991, respondent in 1995 moved pro se to vacate his judgment of conviction. On November 30, 1995, the state trial court denied the motion in an oral decision on the record; no reasons were given. Respondent claims never to have received a copy of a written order reflecting the denial, despite several written requests.

In February 1998, respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dist