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MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
S.K. Gangele and G.D. Saxena, JJ.
State of Madhya Pradesh —Petitioner
versus
Amar Kaur —Respondent
R.P. Nos 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359 and 360 of 2012)
Decided on 16.8.2013
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner/State:Shri Raghvendra Dixit, Government Advocate.
For the Respondents:Smt. Deeksha Mishra, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
It is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under garb of industrial development.
Headnote:(i) Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Delay—Condonation—There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides—A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay—Although delay was caused for not applying in proper time certified copy of order which was essential for further consideration of submitting review and as soon as certified copy was received process of filing became faster so, liberal approach for deciding the case on merits is adopted while condoning delay in filing review petitions before High Court. (Paras 5 and 6)
(ii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114—Review—Acquisition of land—Claimants received compensation under protest and in that eventuality, Collector was enjoined to refer objection to civil court as interests and rights of parties in regard to compensation are protected by provisions relating to apportionment of compensation and provisions for referring disputes to a civil court for apportionment of compensation—This having not been done, order impugned as well as the order passed by Single Judge was rightly set aside by High court in Writ appeal—Petitioners/State has been unable to show that order sought to be reviewed suffers from some mistake or error apparent on face of record or there exists some other reason which is sufficient for reviewing earlier order—Review Petitions dismissed. (Para 18)
Result: Review Petitions dismissed.
G.D. Saxena, J.—Since the order challenged in the aforesaid review petitions is one and the same, all these petitions are herewith, taken up together for final disposal by this common order.
(2) As the instant review preferred by the petitioners/State is hit with delay of 62 days for which an I.A. No. 3990/12 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been moved, before considering the contents of review, we think it proper to take up first the contents of application seeking condonation of delay.
(3) The grounds for causing delay in submitting the review petition are that after pronouncement of the order dated 6th July 2012 in Writ Appeal No. 205/2012, the certified copy was obtained on 31st August 2012 by the concerning department. Then, the matter was referred for obtaining necessary sanction and after receiving concurrence, the review petition came to be filed. It is mentioned in the application that the time was exhausted due to departmental procedure which was not based on mala fide on the part of the petitioners. Hence, it is requested that by allowing the application, delay that was caused in preferring the review petition may be condoned and the review itself may be heard on merits. To support submissions contained in the application, reliance is placed on the decision of Hon. Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad, 2000(9) SCC page 94.
(4) Opposing the aforesaid prayer, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that the delay was caused due to negligent acts of the officer-in-charge of the case who, despite of getting knowledge, did not take proper steps for legal recourses in compliance of the directions contained in the order dated 6th July 2012. The officer-in-charge further failed to take requisite steps for contesting the matter before the court of law within the period prescribed of limitation. So, according to the learned counsel the State cannot take the advantage of the negligent acts of its employees in this way. On this basis, it is prayed that the application for condonation of delay may be dismissed.
(5) In Collector (LA) Vs. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, at page 108 the Hon. Apex Court considered the question of delay in filing the appeal beyond limitation and was pleased to observe as follows :-
“2. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”.
The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an
appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable ne
