The main legal point established in the judgment is that a mistake of law is not in itself a sufficient ground for review, and the limitations of review under O. 47, R. 1 were emphasized.

1. This is an application to review a judgment delivered on 23rd October 1935 in by a learned Additional Judicial Commissioner. The matter comes before another Court because that Judge has retired. The point of law is reasonably plain and can be stated thus: Land was granted by the Crown to a grantee in a form that attracted the Inam Rules in the Berar Code and in particular Rr. 5, 11 and 15. As a result, the inamdar-grantee is entitled to get a certificate which would give protection against attachment. In this case the ancestors of the inamdar-grantee had given a portion of the subject-matter of the grant to the ancestore of the plaintiff who claims protection from attachment for the subject-matter of this suit. The inam was however conferred on the inamdar-grantee and not upon the person entitled as representative of his grantee. The representative of that person did not apply to the Inam Commissioner, did not get the certificate given to inamdars, was consequently not called upon to pay a quit rent and receive a freehold estate as provided by R. 5: see also Rr. 11 and 15. The learned Judge nevertheless held that the representatives of the donees from the predecessor-in-title of the inamdar had an estate that could not be attached as though they were inamdars.

2. We have little doubt that in so deciding, the learned Judge arrived at a wrong conclusion. That however does not dispose of this matter. This is a review. The question to what extent error of law can be raised in review is not without difficulty, and we have had our attention drawn to Mukundsa v. Motiram,1929 25 NLR 104 at p. 106, British Equitable Atsurance Co. Ltd. v. Bajaram,1928 118 IndCas 896, Mt. Rukhmabal v. Ganpatrao,1932 28 NLR 221, Sheikh Kawdu v. Berar Ginning Co. Ltd., Akot,1929 116 IndCas 427, Murari Rao v. Balvanth Dikshit,1924 76 IndCas 342, Maung Pa Hla v. Ma Ngwe Sint,1937 167 IndCas 449, Ramchandra v. Govindrao,1925 23 NLR 53 and finally the decision of the Judicial Committee in Chajju Ram v. Neki,1922 72 IndCas 566. Chajju Ram v. Neki,1922 72 IndCas 566 is a decision of a Full Bench of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. From the arguments and a reference in the judgment it is clear that their Lordships considered the mass of conflicting decisions which existed, a conflict which probably was the reason for constituting a Full Bench, so as to set at rest finally this kind of question. The actual judgment is short but we think it establishes the following propositions: (I) Rule 1 of O.17, is definitive of the limits within which review is permitted. (II) ''Any sufficient reason'' in that Rule means a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those specified immediately before. (III) Procedure by way of review is different from procedure by way of appeal and arises only when there is, (a) new material overlooked by excusable misfortune, (b) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, (c) other sufficient reason analogous to (a) or (b). (IV) It is not sufficient to found review that the Judge whose judgment is under review had ''proceeded upon an incorrect exposition of the law'' (see p. 132 as read in with p. 135).,

3. This case was followed in Ramchandra v. Govindrao,1925 23 NLR 53 by a Bench of the Judicial Commissioner's Court and it was there held that V. a mistake of law is not in itself a sufficient mistake or error apparent on the face of the record to warrant a review. In that case review was sought on the ground that the decision was based on, a judgment since overruled. It was laid down as an expansion in Chajju Ram v. Neki,1922 72 IndCas 566 that (see p. 55): VI. It is not sufficient that the mistake of law is due to following a had precedent i. e. a precedent since overruled or reversed.

4. On the other band a different view has been taken in Brindaban Chandra v. Damodar Prosad,1925 85 IndCas 65and Garabini Kumarin v. Surja Narain Singh,1924 75 IndCas 177. In the latter case the decision proceeded on the ground tha