The plea of minority, when established, is a complete defense to an action, and the court also considered the plea of undue influence but found it not to be proved.

Staples, A J C—The predecessor in title of the respondents, Mirzakhan, brought a suit on a bond for Rs. 800 dated 27th November 1927, executed by the appellant. The suit was dismissed, but on appeal the decree was reversed and the District Judge passed a decree for Rs. 912 with interest at 6 per cent, per annum from the date of the suit until realisation. The defendant has now preferred this second appeal.

2. The execution of the bond was admitted, but two pleas were taken by the appellant: one that he was a minor at the date of the execution and therefore was not liable and secondly, that the bond was executed under undue influence. These pleas were accepted by the trial Court, which decided the case really on the first plea of minority. The lower appellate Court however has found that the appellant Liladhar was not a minor and that there was no undue influence. The finding as regards minority would appear to be a finding of fact, but it is not, I think, binding upon this Court in second appeal, because the lower appellate Court was under a misapprehension with regard to the documentary evidence adduced in the case. I would refer to the two certificates, Exs. D-1 and D-4, and to the copies of school registers, Exs. D-2 and D-3. The lower appellate Court purports to follow the decision in Mr. Collier v. Mrs. Baron,1906 2 NagLR 34 with regard to these certificates. That decision however had been distinguished in Manikchand v. Krishna, 1932 AIR(Nag) 117, where it has been held, following the decision in Bhanudas v. Krishnabai, 1927 AIR(Bom) 11, that these certificates being duly prepared according to authority are admissible in evidence. The case in Manikchand v. Krishna, 1932 AIR(Nag) 117 was not published at the time that the appeal was decided in the lower appellate Court. Had it been published, there is no doubt that the District Judge would have taken a different view of the matter and would have accepted the evidence of the certificates, Exs. D-1 and D-4, and of the copies of the school registers, Exs. D-2 and D-3. As this evidence was improperly rejected by the lower appellate Court, I hold that the finding is not binding upon me, and on that evidence I find that Liladhar was a minor at the date of the execution of the bond.

3. The plea of minority, when found to be established, is a complete defence to an action of this kind, and I would only refer to Gulabchand v. Chunnilal, 1929 AIR(Nag) 156 in this connexion. It will not be necessary therefore to go into the question of undue influence that was raised in the Courts below, but I would only add that I agree with the view taken by the lower appellate Court in this matter and would hold that undue influence has not been proved. On the finding however on the question of minority the appeal must succeed. The decree of the lower appellate Court is therefore set aside and instead the decree of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit is restored. Costs of the appeal in both Courts and of the suit will be borne by the plaintiffs-respondents.