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1932 Supreme(Nagpur) 1

HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Niyogi
YESHWANT AND ORS – Appellant
Versus
EMPEROR – Respondent
Decided on : 05-01-1932

The central legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of maintaining public peace, the limitations on the freedom of individuals in certain situations, and the importance of rigorously enforcing the law to address disturbances of public peace.

Headnote:

Section 151 - Public Peace - Section 151, I.P.C. - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 151, I.P.C., Section 30, Criminal P. C., Section 144, Criminal P. C., Section 30, Police Act 1861, Section 30-A, Police Act 1861, Section 127, Criminal P. C. - The court discussed the application of Section 151, I.P.C. and related provisions in the context of a procession leading to a disturbance of public peace. It highlighted the legal principles from Beatty v. Gillbanks, Wise v. Dunning, and emphasized the necessity of maintaining public peace and the limitations on the freedom of individuals in certain situations. The court also analyzed the conduct of the assembly and the lawful rights of the processionists in determining the legality of the command to disperse.

Fact of the Case:

The applicants were convicted of knowingly joining an assembly likely to cause a disturbance of the peace. They disobeyed a police order to disperse during a procession, leading to a violent attack by another group. The court analyzed the legality of the procession, the police command, and the conduct of the assembly.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the processionists were not likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace and that the command to disperse was not lawful. It criticized the Sub-Inspector's handling of the situation and emphasized the importance of enforcing the law rigorously.

Issues: The issues revolved around the legality of the procession, the justification for the police command to disperse, and the conduct of the assembly in relation to public peace.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the lack of evidence showing the processionists' conduct as objectionable or provocative, and the absence of requisite conditions for a lawful command to disperse under Section 127, Criminal P. C.

Final Decision: The court set aside the convictions and sentences, directing the applicants to be acquitted and the fines to be refunded.

JUDGMENT

Niyogi, A J C—Yeshwanta, son of Vishwanath, and 16 others were convicted of the offence of knowingly joining and continuing in an assembly of more than five persons likely to cause a disturbance of the peace, after it was commanded to disperse, punishable under Section 151, I.P.C., and sentenced to pay fines of Rs. 200 each, with the exception of one who was fined Rs. 100. On appeal the First Class Magistrate exercising powers under Section 30, Criminal P. C., upheld the conviction, but reduced the fines to Rs. 50 each, and in one case to Rs. 25. All of them have filed a joint application for revision in this Court. On 24th August 1930 at Lonar the applicants headed a procession which is described as Shila Pola procession with music playing and moved along a route leading past the front of a mosque. The Moslems had gathered in the mosque determined to resist the applicants' procession with violence. With a view to avert a disturbance of the public peace, the Sub-Inspector of Police commanded the processionists to stop the music and disperse. The applicants disobeyed the order on the ground that they had a lawful right to use a public way for leading their procession with music and moved forward when the Moslems made a violent attack culminating in grievous hurt to several members of the procession. The situation was brought under control by opening fire.

2. The lower appellate Court found that the Hindus had been going in procession with music past the mosque in previous years and that such processions were permitted by the Subdivisional Officer, but it held that the readiness of the Moslems who had assembled in the mosque to resist the progress of the Hindu procession with violence created a reasonable apprehension that the processionists were likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace which justified the Sub-Inspector in commanding the applicants to disperse, and consequently that the applicants were guilty of the offence punishable under Section 151, I. P. C., by reason of their having defied the command. It appears from the record that the applicants' procession was, being taken out when no prayers were being recited at the mosque. It is strenuously contended for the applicants that their procession was lawful and not likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace. Reliance is placed on Beatty v. Gillbanks,1883 9 QB 308 for the proposition that a lawful assembly cannot be dispersed simply because it is threatened with opposition by another body of men to the danger of the public peace. In the reported case the facts were that one William Beatty, who was Captain and a leader of the Salvation Army, was in the habit of organizing and directing processions headed by musical band, flags and banners. In the past he was opposed by another organized band of persons called the Skeleton Army. To obviate a recurrence of collusion between the two bands, a public notice signed by two of the Justices of the Peace was issued calling upon all persons to abstain from assembling in the public streets to the disturbance of the public peace, and a copy of the notice was served on Beatty. The procession headed by Beatty was stopped by the police force and he was prosecuted for being a member of an unlawful assembly. While reversing his conviction in appeal Field, J., observed as follows :

What has happened here is that an unlawful assembly has assumed to itself the right to prevent the appellants and others from lawfully assembling together, and the finding of the justice amounts to this: that a man may be convicted for doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an unlawful act. There is no authority for such a proposition:'' see Beatty v. Gillbanks,1883 9 QB 308.

3. In Wise v. Dunning, 1902 1 KB 167 Lord Alverstone, C. J., referred inter alia to the observations of Field, J., occurring in Beatty v. Gillbanks,1883 9 QB 308:

Now I entirely concede that everyone must be taken to intend the natural cons


























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