The main legal point established in the judgment is that Article 29 of the Limitation Act does not apply when there is no wrongful seizure, and instead, Article 62 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act may apply.

W T W Baker—The facts are set forth in the judgments of the Courts below. It has been found by both the Courts below that the money paid into Court by the Plaintiff remained his property and that the creditors of Hiralalsa were not justified in taking it, but the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed as barred by limitation under Article 29 or the Limitation Act.

2. Plaintiff makes this second appeal on the ground that Article 29 does not apply and that in any case the lower appellate Court was not justified in dismissing the suit under Order 41, Rule 33, Code of Civil Procedure Code, against the Defendants 2 and 3, against whom a separate decree had been passed and who had not appealed.

3. It is argued by the learned Advocate on behalf of the applicant that in order that Article 29 of the Limitation Act should apply the case must fall either under Order 21, Rule 31, or Rule 43 which it does not, and refers to Yellammal v. Ayyappa Naick at 984 and 987 and Ram Narain v. Brij Banke Lal as showing that a prohibitory order is not seizure.

4. The Respondent relies on Jagiivan(sic) Javerdas v. Gulam Jilani Chaudhari , in which it was held that a suit to re-cover money wrongly taken under a decree is a suit for compenation to which the limitation of one year under Article 29 of the Limitation Act applies. It is contended that the facts of that case are on all fours with the present case and that it has been followed by this Court in two reported cases, viz. Tajoo Patel v. Mahamedali Abdulali at 79 and Nagoba v. Madholala Kalar at 54. As Jagjivan Javertdas v. Gulam Jilani Chaudhari has been expressly dissented from by both the

5. Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts in Lakshmi Priya Choudhurani(sic) v. Rama Kanta Shaha and Naidar Singh v. Ganga Dei it will be necessary to see what the facts in the Bombay case were. They are not the same as in the present case. The Defendant obtained a decree against the Plaintiff's father and in execution thereof attached an allowance payable from the Government Treasury. After the death of the Plaintiff's father the Plaintiff succeeded to the hak(sic) in his own right and sued to recover the amount wrongfully drawn by Defendant. There was no question of the money being paid into Court. Of the two local cases, that in 4 Nagpur L. R. is a case of attachment of manure, and that in 7 C.P.L.R. is a case of actachment of cattle. The case which is really most like the facts of the present case is Rupabai v. Audimulam in which money paid into Court by a Zemindar for the benefit of a lessee of the estate was paid out to a creditor of the lessee. It was contended that if the money was wrongfully paid, it was wrongfully seized within the meaning of Article 29 of the limitation Act, but the Court held that the process meant by that article refers to process under which seizure takes place. Hero there was no seizure. The fund was in Court and was subject to the order of the Court. Article 29 did not apply, and Article 120 was held to apply.

6. In the 30 Calcutta case quoted above, where the attachment was of the surplus proceeds of a sale in the hands of the Collector, it was held that the article contemplates wrongful seizure, the seizure of moveable property under legal process, and that by reason of such wrongful seizure a person has been damnified, whereas the Plaintiffs are not complaining of any injury by reason of the attachment and are not claiming compensation on that account, but say that the money rightfully belongs to them and therefore seek to recover it as having been wrongfully taken from the Collector. Hence Article 29 did not apply.

7. In view of these rulings I am of opinion that there has(sic) been no wrongful seizure in the present case AND that Article 20 does not apply. Either Article 62 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act applied. In either case the suit is within time. It is unnecessary to go into the other question of the applicability of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the