The limitation for an application for possession of immovable property purchased at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession runs from the date of sale becoming absolute, and not from the date of grant of the certificate of sale.

1. This is a Letters Patent appeal' against the decision of Mudholkar J. The point that arises for consideration is simple. The Respondent's husband was a decree-holder in execution of whose decree the house in the case was sold and the sale became absolute in favour of the Respondent's husband on 14-2-1940. The Respondent made an application on 12-11-1941 for possession of the house. The application was not accompanied by the certificate contemplated by Order 21, Rule 94, Code of Civil Procedure, and it appears that no such certificate had been obtained. On 8-4-1943, the Respondent applied for the certificate. That was more than three years after the sale became absolute. The contention of the judgment-debtors in this appeal is that the Respondent not being in possession of a certificate was incompetent to apply for possession regard being had, to the words of Order 21, Rules 94 and 95 and by the time she obtained the certificate the period of limitation had expired. They say that, the application ought, therefore, to have been dismissed.

2. Article 180, Limitation Act, by which this matter is governed provides as follows: 180. By a purchaser of 3 years. When the sale immovable property at a becomes ab- sale in execution of a solute; decree for delivery of possession.

This article makes no reference to the certificate. It merely speaks of 'a purchaser'. The question is whether the purchaser who has not yet obtained a certificate from the Court is incompetent to apply or if he does apply the Court is bound to dismiss his petition unless he can produce a certificate within the period of limitation.

3. The rights of the purchaser at a Court sale do not commence when the certificate is granted. Under Section 65 of the Code the property is deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. In dealing with the vesting of property in the auction-purchaser Mulla in his Code of Civil Procedure (1941) has correctly pointed out the interrelation of Order 21, Rules 90-96 and Section 65 of the Code. It is stated by him at page 264: In the case of a private sale of immovable property, the property vests in the purchaser from the time when the deed of sale is executed. The reason is that a voluntary sale becomes absolute on execution and delivery of the deed by the vendor. In the case, however, of a Court sale, the property does not vest in the purchaser immediately on the sale thereof. The reason is that a compulsory sale does not become absolute until some time after the sale. A period of at least thirty days must expire from the date of sale before the sale can become absolute. During that period the sale is liable to be set aside at the instance of the judgment-debtor on the ground of irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale, or on deposit by him in Court of the amount specified in the sale proclamation together with a percentage on the purchase money by way of compensation to the purchaser (Order 21, Rules 89-90). The application by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale in either of these two cases must be made within 30 days from the date of sale. Where no such application is made, the Court must make an order confirming the sale, 'and it is upon such confirmation that the sale becomes absolute' (Order 21, Rule 92). After the sale has become absolute, a certificate is granted by the Court to the purchaser which is called a certificate of sale (Order 21, Rule 94). Such certificate bears as date the day on which the sale became absolute. It is only when the sale becomes absolute that the property sold vests in the purchaser - Vishnu v. Yusuff, 1925 AIR(Bom) 483 (A). But though the property does not vest in the purchaser until the sale has become absolute, when it does vest in him it 'shall' be deemed to have vested on the sale becoming absolute 'from the time when it was sold'. The vesting of the property is thus made to relate back to the dat