Section 33-B of the Income-tax Act, 1922, is not retrospective in operation and is applicable only to assessment years subsequent to the assessment year 1948-49.

1. This is a reference under Section 66 (1), Income-tax Act, by which the following question of law has been referred to this Court: Whether the Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. and Berar (now Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal) was competent under Section 33 B. Income-tax Act, to revise the order made by the Income-tax Officer on 22nd July 1947?

2. The Assessee Niranjanlal Rambhallabh claimed registration of their firm for the assessment year 1944-45 and by the order dated 22-7-1947 the Income-tax Officer granted this application and registered the firm for the assessment year 1944-45. By the order dated 19-7-1949 the Commissioner, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by S. 33-B of the Act, set aside the order on the ground that there was no genuine firm in existence for the relevant assessment year. The Commissioner further observed that "inasmuch as the assessment case was pending before the Income-tax Officer having been remanded by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it was open to the Assessee to press its claim for registration for that year if made and supported by a more convincing and reliable evidence". The Assessee's appeal to the Appellate Tribunal to set aside this order was rejected on 15-4-1950 and that order has given rise to this reference.

3. It is settled law that the assessment for any year is to be made in accordance with the law in force on the date the Indian Finance Act for that year comes into force. In - ' Maharaja of Pithapuram v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras, 1945 AIR(PC) 89, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed: It should be remembered that the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended from time to time, forms a code which has no operative effect except so far as it is rendered applicable for the recovery of tax imposed for a particular fiscal year by a Finance Act. This may be illustrated by pointing out that there was no charge on the 1938-39 income either of the Appellant or his daughters nor assessment of such income, until the passing of the Finance Act of 1939, which imposes the tax of 1939-40 on the 1938-39 income and authorized the present assessment. By Sub-section (1) of S. 6, Finance Act, 1939, income-tax for the year beginning on 1-4-1939 is directed to be charged at the rates specified in Part I of Sch. II and rates of super-tax are also provided for and by Sub-section (3) it is provided that 'for the purposes of this section and of Sch. II the expression "total income" means total income as determined for the purposes of income-tax or super-tax as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922'. This can only refer to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as it stood amended at the date of the Indian Finance Act, 1939, and necessarily includes the alterations made by the Amending Act, which had already come into force on 1-4-1939.

In - ' Mishrimal Gulabchand, In re, 1950 AIR(All) 270, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court had to consider the effect of the first proviso to S. 24 (1) in the case of assessment for the year 1944-45. The amendment was made on 12-4-1944 after the passing of the Finance Act for that year. It was held, following the above Privy Council decision, that the added proviso would not apply to the assessment made for the year 1944-45.

4. Under the Act of 1922 assessment is made in the case of registered firms on the share income of the individual partners and not on the income of the firm as such. Section 26-A and the rules framed thereunder provide for registration of a firm and the order passed by the Income-tax Officer is appealable under Section 30 at the instance of the Assessee and not at the instance of the Commissioner. The registration is operative for that assessment year only. If, however, the bogus nature of the firm comes to light after the firm is registered, the Income-tax Officer has the power under R. 6-B to cancel the certificate of registration. That power was not exercised in the instan