JUDGMENT

Coldstream, J. - The appellants are proprietors of village Mansowal in Garhshankar tahsil of Hoshiarpur District. A certain area of land in the village, admittedly the property of the appellants, was recorded as a public thoroughfare. The respondents, who are occupancy tenants in the village, have appropriated parts of this thoroughfare by erecting huts, etc., upon it. The appellants sued for an order against the respondents to remove the erection or put the appellants in possession, alleging that the respondents had put up the huts, etc., four years previously. The respondents pleaded that they had acquired a prescriptive title in the site by adverse possession. The trial Court found that the respondents had taken possession of the site in 1921 and that the suit was not barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge accordingly gave a decree in the plaintiffs' favour in the form of a perpetual injunction against the obstruction of the thoroughfare by the respondents. The respondents appealed. The District Judge confirmed the finding that the respondents had taken possession in 1921, but holding that the suit was barred by Article 32, Lim. Act, he accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit.

2. Against this judgment the proprietors have appealed. Mr. Niaz Muhammad, who has argued the appeal, relies upon Achar Singh v. Badhawa Singh [1912] 124 P.R. 1912 and Masharaf Ali v. Iftikhar Hussain [1888] 10 All. 634 in support of his contention that Article 32 is not applicable to a suit of this kind. For the respondents Mr. Niamat Rai refers to Bishambar Sahai v. Janki Das A.I.R. 1922 All. 320 and Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Satar A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 653 in support of the view adopted by the lower appellate Court.

3. I have referred to these and other rulings on the subject of the application of Article 32. It is not easy to derive from these authorities any clear principles on which the applicability of Article 32 has been determined in cases resembling the one now before me. I note, however, that the view expressed in Bishambar Sahai v. Janki Das A.I.R. 1922 All. 320 was subsequently dissented from by a Division Bench of the Allahabad Court in Mohan v. Bishambar Sahai A.I.R. 1924 All. 450. There can be no doubt that Article 32 can properly be applied only where the person proceeded against had, before the perversion in respect of which he is being sued took place, a right to "use the property for specific purposes." Can it be said that in this case the defendants had a right to use the site in suit for specific purposes? I think not. They could pass over the land, but as individuals or members of the community they had no specific right of any kind peculiar to themselves, nor had they any rights in the land under colour of which they could set up obstructions on the public thoroughfare. The case appears to resemble closely in its nature the case Achar Singh v. Badhawa Singh [1912] 124 P.R. 1912 in which Article 32 was not held to govern limitation. This decision has recently been followed by a learned Judge of this Court in Gurdit Singh v. Hari Singh A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 792, a case apparently on all fours with the present case.

4. My present opinion is that Article 32 was not intended to apply to a case in respect of land in which the person proceeded against had no other right than a right in common with the general public, to pass over it. This view does not I think conflict with the existing decisions. My conclusion is that the article applicable in the present case was Article 120 and that the suit was wrongly dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge.

5. On the merits the matter is settled by the lower Court's findings of fact in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants who are entitled to the decree given by the trial Court. The appeal is accordingly accepted with costs throughout, the judgment of the Additional District Judge is set aside and the decree of the first Court is restored.