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1943 Supreme(FC) 5

Federal Court
Spens, C.J.
Bank of Commerce Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Amulya Krishna Basu Roy Chowdhury - Respondent
Decided On : 08-12-1943

JUDGMENT

Spens, C.J.

1.These appeals arise out of applications made by two judgment-debtors for relief under Section 36, Bengal Money-lenders Act, 1910. The appellant's predeeessor-in-title had obtained small cause decrees against the respondents in 1933 and 1938 respectively and certain payments had been made towards them. On 30th August and 1st September 1941, the judgment-debtors applied to the Court to reopen the decrees, scale down the debts and direct refund of amounts that might be found to have been overpaid on taking accounts according to the provisions of the Act. To these claims the appellant bank raised various objections, but they were overruled by the Subordinate Judge and the judgment-debtors were awarded small amounts by way of refund. The bank took the matter on revision to the High Court at Calcutta, on the plea that the decrees had been obtained on "promissory notes" and that the Provincial Legislature had no authority to enact measures affecting promissory notes. This contention was overruled by the High Court on the authority of a Full Bench decision of that Court 45 G.W.N. 609: Harsukhdass Balkiasendas v.Dhirendra Nath Roy ('41) 28 A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 498. That Full Bench judgment was based on the decision of this Court in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan ('41) 28 A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 47. The ratio decidendi in that case was that similar provincial legislation in pith and substance related to "money-lending and money-lenders" (Entry No. 27, List II of Schedule 7) and that any argument based on the exclusion of promissory notes from the sphere of provincial legislation would not avail in cases where claims under promissory notes had merged in decrees made before the commencement of the Provincial Act. On all material facts, these cases very closely resemble Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan ('41) 28 A.I.R. 1941 F.C.47 and if, that decision is applicable here, these appeals must fail. Counsel for the appellant has accordingly attempted to distinguish that case with reference to certain differences in the provisions of the two provincial enactments. We have to decide whether these differences make any difference to the result.

2. The Bengal Money-lenders Act is like the Madras enactment which was the subject-matter in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan ('41) 28 A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 47 part of a scheme to relieve agricultural indebtedness in the various provinces of this country, but the enactments passed in the different provinces have not all adopted the same lines. The Bengal Act begins with a comprehensive definition of the words "loan" and "lender," but excepts certain kinds of loans from the operation of the Act by taking them out of the definition. It makes detailed provisions for the registration and licensing of money-lenders and for the accounts to be maintained by them. The relief intended to be afforded by the Act is provided for in chaps. 6 and 7. Chapter 6 fixes maximum rates of interest recoverable on loans and the total amount recoverable for interest and principal in respect of any loan. Chapter 7, of which Section 36 forms part, provides for the reopening of settlements and of decrees of Courts in certain circumstances and for other ameliorative orders. The portion of the definition section relevant to the present case runs as follows:

Loan means an advance, whether of money or in kind, made on condition of repayment with interest and includes any transaction which is in substance a Joan, but does not include * * * *

(e) an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument as defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, other than a promissory note.

Among the relieving provisions, the relevant clauses are Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 36. Subsection (1) gives the Court power to reopen transactions "in any suit to which this Act applies" and by the definition clause this expression includes not only suits instituted after 1st January 1939, and suits pending on that d

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