Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:132722

Court No. - 79

Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 4828 of 2022

Revisionist :- Bobby

Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another

Counsel for Revisionist :- Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi,Raj Kumar Gautam

Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Rahul Kumar Sharma

Hon'ble Vipin Chandra Dixit,J.

Supplementary affidavit has been filed by learned counsel for the revisionist,

which is taken on record.

This criminal revision has been filed against thee judgement and order dated

21.10.2022 passed by Sessions Judge, Hathras in Criminal Appeal No. 10 of

2021 (Bobby Vs. State of U.P. and another) as well as against the judgement and

order dated 20.03.2021 passed by Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C.1, Hathras in

Complaint Case No.- 518 of 2019, under Section 138 N.I. Act by which the

revisionist was convicted for one year simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.

6,70,000/-.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the revisionist that now the parties had

amicably settled their dispute and the revisionist had paid Rs. 7,38,300/- to the

complainant. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.2

admits that the complainant has received 7,38,300/- as total outstanding and now

he does not want to prosecute the revisionist in the present case.

Since the parties had amicably settled their dispute and the complainant has

received the entire amount as raised in the complaint case. There is no useful

purpose in keeping the matter pending.

Learned counsel for revisionist has placed reliance on a judgement of Hon'ble

Apex Court in the case of Damodar S. Prabhu Vs. Sayed Babalal H., reported

in 2010 (5) SCC 663. The relevant paragraphs nos.17, 18 & 19 are quoted herein

below:-

"17. In a recently published commentary, the following observations have been

made with regard to the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act [Cited

from: Arun Mohan, Some thoughts towards law reforms on the topic of Section

138, Negotiable Instruments Act-Tackling an avalanche of cases (New Delhi:

Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2009) at p. 5] :

"... Unlike that for other forms of crime, the punishment here (in so far as the

complainant is concerned) is not a means of seeking retribution, but is more a

means to ensure payment of money. The complainant's interest lies primarily in

recovering the money rather than seeing the drawer of the cheque in jail. The

threat of jail is only a mode to ensure recovery. As against the accused who is

willing to undergo a jail term, there is little available as remedy for the holder of

the cheque.

If we were to examine the number of complaints filed which were `compromised'

or `settled' before the final judgement on one side and the cases which proceeded

to judgement and conviction on the other, we will find that the bulk was settled

and only a miniscule number continued."

18. It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonour of cheques, it is

the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the

punitive aspect. There is also some support for the apprehensions raised by the

learned Attorney General that a majority of cheque bounce cases are indeed

being compromised or settled by way of compounding, albeit during the later

stages of litigation thereby contributing to undue delay in justice delivery. The

problem herein is with the tendency of litigants to belatedly choose compounding

as a means to resolve their dispute.

19. As mentioned earlier, the learned Attorney General's submission is that in the

absence of statutory guidance, parties are choosing compounding as a method of

last resort instead of opting for it as soon as the Magistrates take cognizance of

the complaints. One explanation for such behaviour could be that the accused

persons are willing to take the chance of progressing through the various stages

of litigation and then choose the route of settlement only when no other route

remains. While such behaviour may be viewed as rational fr