Court No. - 51

Case :- GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 688 of 2018

Appellant :- State Of U.P.

Respondent :- Balvir Singh

Counsel for Appellant :- G.A.

Hon'ble Vipin Sinha,J.

Hon'ble Ifaqat Ali Khan,J.

Learned AGA is permitted to carry out the necessary correction in the prayer clause of the

appeal during the course of the day with regard to the circumstances that the sole accused

respondent has been acquitted of the offences under section 25 of the Arms Act.

Heard learned AGA on the application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order

dated 17.4.2018 by means of which accused respondent has been acquitted for the offence

punishable under section 25 of the Arms Act.

Learned A.G.A. has strongly pressed the application with the contention that though the

accused respondent has been convicted under Section 302 IPC and has been sentenced to

undergo life imprisonment, however has been wrongly acquitted of the offence under Section

25 Arms Act. At the very outset, it may be appreciated that incident is of the year 2015 and

recovery of Tamancha has been made from the possession of the applicant on 13.1.2016.

We have perused the findings as has been recorded by the court concerned. The court

concerned has given cogent reasons for disbelieving the prosecution case in this regard. The

findings are based on evidence on record. The court concerned has clearly observed that there

is no independent witness of the recovery whereas recovery has been shown from public

place. There is no forensic examination report which may show the use of the weapon in the

alleged crime.

Reference may be made to the recent judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of

Bannareddy & Ors. vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors reported in 2018 (5) SCC 790

wherein the Apex Court has held as under:

11. Before we proceed further to peruse the finding of the High Court, it is relevant to discuss

the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal.

It is well settled principle of law that the High Court should not interfere in the well reasoned

order of the trial court which has been arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence.

The High Court should give due regard to the findings and the conclusions reached by the

trial court unless strong and compelling reasons exist in the evidence itself which can

dislodge the findings itself. This principle has further been elucidated in the case of Sambhaji

Hindurao Deshmukh and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186, para 13,

wherein this Court observed that: "The High Court will interfere in appeals against

acquittals, only where the trial court makes wrong assumptions of material facts or fails to

appreciate the evidence properly. If two views are reasonably possible from the evidence on

record, one favouring the accused and one against the accused, the High Court is not

expected to reverse the acquittal merely because it would have taken the view against the

accused had it tried the case. The very fact that two views are possible makes it clear that the

prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and

consequently the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt.

12. It is not in dispute that the presumption of innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and

strengthened against the acquitted accused by the judgment in his favor. [Vide Rabindra

Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh vs. Republic of India, (2011) 2 SCC 490 in para. 94].

27. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the prosecution was

not able to establish the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the

High Court should not have re-appreciated evidences in its entirety, especially when there

existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial court. There exists no justification behind

setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, especially when the prosecution

case suffers from se