1. Heard Shri Aditya Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sharad Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 29.01.2025, whereby the Commercial Court, Lucknow proceeded to dismiss the application filed by the petitioner under S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act for recalling the order dated 27.09.2022, whereby the objections filed by the petitioner under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were rejected.

3. The facts, in brief, are that on account of certain supplies made by the petitioner, the respondent claiming itself to be MSME raised a claim before the MSME Council, which in turn, appointed an arbitrator and an award came to be passed against the petitioner. Challenging the said award, the application was filed under S.34 of the Act, which was pending before the Commercial Court. As the petitioner did not appear on certain dates, an order came to be passed on 27.09.2022 dismissing the application under S.34 of the Act in default. After the said order came to be passed, an application was filed seeking recall of the order dated 27.09.2022. The said application was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. The application and the delay condonation application were filed on 09.04.2024. In support of the reasons for condonation of delay as was sought by the petitioner, it was pleaded in the application that the order dated 27.09.2022 was never informed by the counsel to the petitioner, as such, he approached another counsel on 01.03.2024 and when he made inquiries then the factum of the order being passed on 27.09.2022 was revealed and, thereafter, the newly engaged counsel moved an application for recall of the order dated 27.09.2022 along with a delay condonation application. The Commercial Court did not agree with the reasoning given in the delay condonation application and found that the cause shown for condonation of delay would not fall within the place of sufficient cause and thus, proceeded to dismiss the said application vide impugned order dated 29.01.2025.

4. Challenging the said order, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that it is fairly well settled that the cause of justice cannot be defeated on account of procedural hiccups.

5. He places reliance on the following judgements with the paragraphs, which are quoted herein - below:
I. Judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst Katiji and others 1987 (2) SCC 107 : (AIR 1987 SC 1353). The relevant paragraph No.3 is quoted herein - below:
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S.52 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life - purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and