1. Petitioners challenge an FIR registered under BNSS Sections for alleged offences, contending it is belated and malicious. (Para 3 )
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2026 Supreme(Online)(All) 337
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Rajeev Misra, Lakshmi Kant Shukla, JJ
Alina Rizvi – Appellant
Versus
State Of Up – Respondent
CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 27807 of 2025
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Kashif Zaidi
For the Respondents: G.A.
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Kashif Zaidi
For the Respondents: G.A.
The court entertained a petition to quash an FIR based on arguments regarding significant unexplained delay in lodging the report, the existence of a commercial arbitration agreement, and the potential for the criminal proceedings to be a malicious counter-blast to prior litigation.
Headnote:(A) Criminal Procedure - Quashing of FIR - Unexplained Delay - Petitioners challenged the FIR on the grounds of a delay of over two years and nine months in lodging the report, arguing that such unexplained delay renders the prosecution unsustainable. (Para 4)
(B) Civil vs Criminal Liability - Commercial Relationship - Presence of an arbitration clause in a work order suggests that disputes should be resolved through the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 rather than criminal prosecution, which may constitute an abuse of process. (Para 5)
(C) Malicious Prosecution - Counter-blast - Allegation that the present FIR was engineered to overcome the rigour of a previous FIR lodged by the petitioners against the respondent. (Para 8)
Issues: Whether the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed due to unexplained delay, the commercial nature of the dispute, and alleged malice.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- crime and sentencing
- practice and procedure
Table of Contents
2. Petitioners argue unexplained delay in lodging FIR renders prosecution unsustainable. State opposes, citing cognizable offences disclosed. (Para 4 , 7 )
3. Court finds matter requires consideration after hearing parties and perusing record. (Para 9 )
4. Court, at admission stage, finds a prima facie case exists warranting notice and interim protection from arrest. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 )
5. Court issues notice, grants interim protection from arrest to petitioners until further orders. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 )
6. Can an FIR be quashed solely on the ground of unexplained delay in lodging it?
The court has not decided the issue; it has only found that the matter requires consideration at the stage of issuing notice. (Para 9 , 14 )
7. Is a contractual arbitration clause a bar to the registration of a criminal FIR?
The court has not decided this issue; the matter is at the notice stage and pending further hearing. (Para 5 , 9 , 14 )
8. What is the test for granting interim protection from arrest pending consideration of an FIR quashing petition?
The court granted interim protection considering the facts, circumstances, and submissions, without deciding the merits at this stage. (Para 9 , 15 )
1. Heard Mr. Kashif Zaidi, the learned counsel for petitioners and the learned A.G.A representing State/respondents 1, 2 and 3.
2. Perused the record.
3. Petitioners-Anila @ Anila Rizvi and 2 others have approached this Court by means of present Criminal Misc. Writ Petition challenging the first informant report dated 24.09.2025 lodged by first informant/respondent-4, Manav Arora and registered as Case Crime No. 0749 of 2025 under Sections 318 (4), 316 (5), 61 (2), 308 (3), 352, 351 (3) BNSS , Police Station- Siszrakh, District-Gautam Budh Nagar.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner in challenge to the impugned F.I.R. contends that in the day, date and time column of occurrence mentioned in the impugned F.I.R., no material particulars have been furnished. He has then taken the Court to the body of the F.I.R. and on basis thereof, he contends that as per the prosecution case the occurrence giving rise to present criminal proceedings is alleged to have occurred on 30.12.2022. However, the impugned F.I.R. was lodged on 24.09.2025 i.e. after an expiry of a period of more than 2 years and almost 9 months. As such, the F.I.R. is highly belated. On the above premise, the learned counsel for petitioners submits that criminal prosecution of petitioners on the basis of such a belated F.I.R. cannot sustained. To buttress his submission, he has referred to the judgments of Supreme Court in P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578, P. Rajagopal And Ors. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu , AIR 2019 SC 2866/(2019)(5) SCC 403, Hasmukhial D. Vora and Another Vs. State of U.P. (2022) 15 SCC 164, Sekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2024) 2 SCC 176, Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur @ Banti Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others , 2024 SCC Online 938. According to the learned counsel for petitioners, the Apex Court in aforementioned judgments has itself observed that if there is delay in lodging the F.I.R. but the delay in lodging the F.I.R. has not been sufficiently explained then the same cannot be sustained. Much emphasis was laid upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur @ Banti (supra) wherein the Apex Court quashed the F.I.R. as there was an unexplained delay of 39 days in lodging the F.I.R. Similarly, the Apex Court in Rajesh Patel Vs. State of Jharkhand (2013) 3 SCC 791, Court quashed the criminal prosecution of accused therein on the ground of unexplained delay of 11 days in lodging the F.I.R.
5. It is then contended by the learned counsel for petitioners that the parties were in commercial relationship inasmuch as the petitioners were given a work order by first informant/respondent-4. According to the learned counsel for petitioners, the said work order are also contains an arbitration clause, which is clause 23 of the Contract/Agreement. However, instead of resorting to the arbitration proceedings governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the first informant/respondent 4 has lodged the impugned F.I.R., which is wholly malicious and also an abuse of the process of Court.
6. Referring to the contents of the F.I.R., the learned counsel for petitioners submits that no offence under Section 316 (5) BNSS i.e. Section 409 I.P.C. can be said to be made out against petitioners. On the above conspectus, it is thus contended by the learned counsel for petitioners that the impugned F.I.R. is nothing else but an abuse of the process of Court. Therefore, the same is liable to be quashed by this Court.
7. Per contra, the learned A.G.A representing State/respondents 1., 2 and 3 has vehemently opposed the present writ petition. He submits that since the impugned F.I.R. discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court.
8. In rejoinder, the learned counsel for petitioners referred to the F.I.R. dated 04.08.2023 lodged by petitioner-1 and registered as Case Crime No. 0626 of 2023, under Sections 441, 447, 406, 147 I.P.C., Police Station-Bisarah, District-Madhy
