ORDER:

Heard Sri A.S.K.S.Bhargav, learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Defendants 1 and 2 and Sri Peta Gnana Teja, learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Plaintiff.

2. This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order, dated 31.01.2024, rendered on I.A.No.689 of 2023 in O.S.No.136 of 2016 on the file of the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tenali, whereby the trial Court was pleased to dismiss the petition filed under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to send agreement of sale, dated 02.01.2014 (Ex.A1) to the handwriting expert for comparison of admitted signature of the petitioner with that of the disputed signatures.

3. This Court has been observing that several Civil Revision Petitions are being preferred on account of rejection of similar interlocutory applications. In a large number of cases, interlocutory applications are made after the cross-examination of the Plaintiff and seeking reference of the documents relied upon by the Plaintiff to the handwriting expert. The Suits in which such applications are invariably made, are specific performance suits, money recovery suits based on pronotes and cheques etc., i.e. in general the Plaintiff‟s claim is canvassed on the basis of a document alleged to have been executed by the Defendant. In such cases, at the very initial stage itself, the Defendants have set-up defence of denial of the signature in the very written statement itself. Thereafter, it is found that during the course of cross-examination of the Plaintiff also the Defendant has canvassed the case by way of suggestions, etc.

4. Despite the same, it is found that in a large number of cases, the Courts have tended to reject the applications on the ground of delay or the applications being belated. In the opinion of this Court, the said ground of rejection may not be sustainable in the above circumstance. It is not in dispute that the suggestions etc., put to the Plaintiff during the cross-examination are brushed aside by a mere denial without there being any corroborative material being placed by the Plaintiff. In such an event, the Plaintiff appears to have probabalized his case though not with a high degree of probability. Yet, in the absence of any conclusive admission, contradicting the Plaintiff‟s claim, the same can be viewed as a partial establishment of the Plaintiff‟s claim.

5. In the above circumstance, the onus would also partially shift on to the Defendant and in such an event, the right to rebuttal gets vested in the Defendant and invariably the applications are preferred seeking to establish their defence. But, unfortunately, it is found that such applications are not appreciated in this background, but in isolation and dealt with on the short ground of being belated. The Courts lose sight of the fact that the delay in seeking the relief is on account of delayed commencement of the trial and not on account of any reason attributable to the Defendant. Systemic delay cannot be put against the litigants.

6. It is necessary to look into the elucidation of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, more particularly, with regard to Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while examining the purport and ambit of Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, in Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma1, has been pleased to observe and hold in paras.34 and 35 as under:

„‟34. In the above factual background, for the plaintiff to succeed, she has to establish that she has a legal title to the Schedule „A‟ property, and consequently, is entitled to a decree of possession. The defendants cannot be dispossessed unless the plaintiff has established a better title and rights over the Schedule „A‟ property. A person in possession of land in the assumed character as the owner, and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership, has a legal right against the entire world except the rightful owner.9 A decree of possession cannot be passed in favour of the plai