ORDER :

This writ petition is filed questioning the order dated

03.06.2019 by which the original order of dismissal from service dated 16.04.2019 was confirmed and also seeking a relief of reinstatement of petitioner.

This Court has heard Ms. M.Siva Jyothi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Venkatesh, junior counsel appearing for Sri N.Harinath, Assistant Solicitor General. Learned counsel for the petitioner raises a point that the order dated 03.06.2019 which is impugned is not signed by the appellate authority, but is signed by an Officer who is not authorized. She points out that an order of this nature cannot be signed by or on behalf of the appellate authority. This is the primary contention which she has raised. Learned counsel also argues that the petitioner is sought for certain data and wanted to give certain documents etc., to the authorities before finalizing the appeal, but they have refused the same. Therefore, learned counsel argues that the order is vitiated. An attempt is also made to argue that the punishment is disproportionate to the alleged offences. It is stated that a second enquiry was also commenced but the same was also closed without reasons. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the entire process is vitiated and because of the same, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement by setting aside the two orders.

In reply to this, Sri Venkatesh appearing for the learned Assistant Solicitor General argues that the explanation by the petitioner has been considered. He relies upon the documents filed along with the counter and points out that the evidence was totally considered and only thereafter the impugned order was passed. It is pointed out that the petitioner pleaded guilty to some of the charges also. Learned junior counsel also argues that the in matters of this nature, the Court should lightly interfere and that the preponderance of probabilities is the standard of proof that is required. It is contended that the rules of natural justice was scrupulously followed and that only after hearing the petitioner, the enquiry was concluded. It is also argued that in an appeal, the question of evidence etc., does not arise and therefore both the orders impugned namely the order of the primary authority and the order of the appellate authority are good in law. It is also submitted that the punishment is not disproportionate and is commensurate with the offences alleged. Therefore, learned counsel argues that the writ petition should be dismissed.

Without going deeper into the merits of the matter, this Court notices that even in the counter affidavit filed in para 8, the following is spelt out:

8. In reply to Para 4(a) of the affidavit, it is submitted that the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed on 03.06.2019. The Deputy Director General in his capacity as the Appellate Authority, examined the appeal in full understanding of the case and after having delivered the decision, delegated the responsibility of conveying the same to the petitioner, through the designated Staff Officer, the Additional Director (Administration). The decision has been delivered by the Appellate Authority and conveyed by the designated Staff Officer. Hence, the contention of the petitioner is incorrect.

This Court is of the opinion that on this ground itself, the order passed in the appeal should be set aside. Certain powers cannot be delegated. Quasi judicial power which is to be exercised by the Deputy Director General alone cannot be delegated further. The Deputy Director General is exercising his power in this case as an appellate authority. There is a bounden duty upon him to consider the matter in its entirety by himself and to pass an order by himself. These are no matters which can be delegated further. The appellate authority alone can sign/deliver the order. No other Officer can exercise this power. The procedure that is adopted in this case is incorrect. The appellate authority’s order date