Revision against interlocutory orders is restricted under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C., aiming to ensure prompt disposal of cases while preserving inherent powers in exceptional situations.

ORDER:

The Criminal Revision Case has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C .,’) challenging the interlocutory order filed under Section 391 of ‘the Cr.P.C .,’ to recall her for further evidence in order to exhibit some documents. The learned V Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for Trial of Offences Against Women, Guntur dismissed the petition.

2. No representation for the Petitioner and Respondent No.1. Even though the case is posted on this day, there is no representation for Petitioner and Respondent No.1. Hence, Sri T.D.Phani Kumar, learned Counsel is appointed as learned Legal Aid Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri Ravuri Leela Sai Sampath, learned Counsel is appointed as learned Legal Aid Counsel for Respondent No.1. The Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee is directed to issue necessary orders in this regard.

3. Heard both the learned Legal Aid Counsel and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor.

4. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.

5. Ex-facie the order passed by the learned Appellate Court is interlocutory in nature, against which revision is not maintainable under Section 397 (2) of 'the Cr.P.C .,' as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra¹, at para No.10 it is held as under:

“10. As pointed out in Amar Nath case the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdomdecided tocheck this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Section 397 . On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on theother, thepower has been conferredin almost thesame terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of Section 482 , however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, “shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court”, But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in theexercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one of the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of theHigh Court under the1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court isabsolutely necessary,thennothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent