ORDER:

Record discloses that S.C.No.134 of 2019 pending before the learned Special Judge for Speedy Trial of Offences under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, Vijayawada is for the offences under Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, alternatively under Section 376(2)(i) I.P.C., alternatively under Section 376(2)(k) I.P.C., alternatively under Section 325 read with 376(2)(i) I.P.C.; under Section 314 of SCs and STs (POA) Act and Section 321(w)(i) of SCs and STs (POA)

Act and under Section 417 I.P.C.

2. Necessary charges were framed and evidence of PWs.1 to 7 for prosecution was recorded and Exs.P.1 to P.15 were marked for prosecution. The incriminating evidence available on record was offered to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Responding to some of the questions, the accused had stated that he had the evidence in the form of videos and call records to prove his innocence. He was invited to tender his evidence in defence. He examined DWs.1 and 2. It is thereafter he thought of testifying as one of the witnesses in defence and therefore filed a petition under Section 315 Cr.P.C. seeking permission of the trial Court to permit him to testify as one of the witnesses. He filed another petition seeking permission to receive electronic evidence in the form of whatsapp screen shots, photographs, voice call data, call recordings, video with audio, SMS in a form of CD or pen-drive. He filed another application to reopen the evidence for defence. State filed its counter alleging that these are frivolous petitions filed to cause delay in completion of the proceedings and they were filed subsequent to Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination and they are devoid of valid reasons.

3. The learned trial Court took up all those three petitions as Crl.M.P.Nos.910, 911 and 912 of 2023. After hearing both sides and after considering the material, it dismissed the applications by a common order. The reasons afforded by it are:

 The accused who was telling about electronic evidence did not produce such evidence.

 This case is one under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act where consent of the girl had no legal relevance and therefore, there is no need to have the proposed evidence.

It is on those twin grounds it dismissed the petitions.

4. Aggrieved accused preferred this revision challenging the common order passed on 27.05.2024 in all those applications.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after the prosecution has discharged it is the onus of the defence to prove its defence and in a case of the present nature where special enactment such as POCSO is involved where Section 29 of the said enactment allows certain presumptions against the accused and in favour of the prosecution and the trial Court disentitled the defence by dismissing the applications and that error shall be rectified at once.

6. As against it, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that accused has been causing delay and thereby retarding the progress of the trial.

7. On consideration of the rival submissions and the material on record, it is to be stated that the view taken by the trial Court that the accused before giving his own evidence did not produce the electronic evidence, which is mentioned in the petition is not acceptable at law. In Gajendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan1 interpreting Section 315 Cr.P.C., their Lordships stated that an accused cannot be denied the opportunity to produce the documents on which he relies merely because he did not produce them before his evidence was recorded.

8. The other reason given by the trial Court that in a case of child abuse her consent is of no relevance is a matter that should be eligible to be stated while judging the whole case. It was never expected on part of the Court to disallow a defence in such serious offences especially where the reverse onus is on the accused. The view taken by the trial Court may amount to prejudging the facts.

9. Therefore, both the re